LOGICAL TRACTS,

COMPRISING

OBSERVATIONS and ESSAYS

ILLUSTRATIVE OF

Mr. LOCKE's TREATISE

UPON THE

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING:

With Occasional Remarks on the Writings of the

TWO SCOTTISH PROFESSORS,

REID AND STEWART,

UPON THE SAME SUBJECT:

AND A PREFACE IN VINDICATION OF

Mr. LOCKE,

AGAINST THE

MISTAKES AND MISREPRESENTATIONS

OF THE LATE

Mr. MILNER, of HULL,

Dr. HORNE, BISHOP OF NORWICH;

Mr. KETT, FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD;

AND

Dr. NAPLETON, CANON OF HEREFORD.

By THOMAS LUDLAM, M. A.

Cambridge,

PRINTED BY M. WATSON:

FOR J. NICHOLSON, CAMBRIDGE; SOLD ALSO BY RIVINGTONS, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD, LONDON; COOKE, OXFORD; AND GREGORY, LEICESTER.

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ILLUSTRATIVE OF

MR. LOCKE'S TRIAL FISH

UPON THE

MENTAL CONSTITUTION:

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Dr. NAPLETON, Canon of HEREFORD.

By THOMAS CUDDON, M. A.

Cambridge:

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PREFACE.

THE following papers were intended for the improvement in the art of reaſoning of ſuch young ſtudents in divinity as are *able* to read the writings of Mr. Locke, Biſhops Butler, Hurd and Warburton, with thoſe of Dr. Balguy, Powell and Ogden: as for all others, whether the admirers of Meſſrs. Hutchinſon, Jones (of Nayland, commonly called Trinity Jones) Romaine, Milner, Overton, Swedenborg, &c. &c. no man who knows what reaſoning is, will think of offering any to ſuch, who reject the very foundation of it, *clear* and *preciſe* ideas: you might as well think of inſtructing a man in reading who ſhould refuſe to learn his alphabet.

Taught to conſider the *attainment* of *truth* as a matter of the higheſt concern to intelligent creatures; and *that* of religious truth as the moſt important employment in which men can poſſibly be engaged, I have ever thought my warmeſt gratitude due to that Being, through whoſe kind pro-

vidence the care of my education was intruſted to Drs. Powell and Balguy, of St. John's College, Cambridge. Men whoſe writings have juſtified the opinion the world entertained of their abilities. Poſſeſſed of integrity equal to their abilities, they were much too honeſt to follow the uſual practice of the bigoted partizans of particular opinions: they therefore juſtly thought it their duty, not to furniſh me with their *own* creed, but to teach me to reaſon, and to uſe with propriety and fairneſs, thoſe faculties which God had given me. They had ſenſe enough to ſee, that if they did their duty in this caſe, they could neither be reſponſible for the uſe I might make of my faculties, or for the folly, or falſity of the opinions I might embrace: and as far as the truth, or the wiſdom of theſe opinions depended upon the quantity of abilities I might poſſeſs, they knew performance in this reſpect would be accepted according to what a man hath, and would not be required according to what a man hath not, becauſe the judge of all the earth will do right. It is ſurely very ſtrange that there can be more than one opinion upon this matter, and yet I have heard many of thoſe who are called ſerious Divines, blame the late Norriſian Lecturer, Dr. Hey, for *not* entertaining any *fixed* opinions himſelf, and for *not* teaching his hearers *any* opinions *at all;* and I have heard at leaſt an equal number of the ſame ſort of perſons blame him for entertaining *falſe* opinions, or for teaching his hearers *ſuch*. But ſo it is, though proteſtants univer-

ſally agree to reprobate the infallibility of the Pope they univerſally act, as if all the different denominations of chriſtians were poſſeſſed of it. I was however, taught to pay no regard to human authority in matters of opinion, and to conſider *that* truth alone to be worth attention, which was ſupported by *clear* and uncontrovertible reaſoning; for when the arguments on both ſides are in perfect equilibrium, the matter under conſideration cannot *poſſibly* be of any importance. But though I am far from thinking Mr. Locke, or any man to be infallible, yet in vindicating the character of this great writer, from the aſperſions thrown upon it ſo long after his death; I am but diſcharging a common duty of humanity, which ſurvivers owe to thoſe who have deſerved well of mankind by their literary labours, when they are paſt the power of appearing in their own defence. It is indeed ſingular that *all* Mr. Locke's opponents, from Stillingfleet and Edwards, to Kett and Milner, ſhould ſhew ſuch a decided averſion to the acquiſition of *diſtinct* ideas, and the uſe of clear reaſoning; and it is ſurely not a little wonderful that thoſe who have been conſidered as men of real piety ſhould be *diſhoneſt* enough to bring *general* charges, which no man can refute, becauſe no man can diſcover the points objected to. Of this ſort is that brought by Mr. Joſeph Milner, in his reply to Gibbon. In p. 154, he tells us, that Mr. Locke led the faſhion of introducing a *pompous parade* of *reaſoning* into religion: from that time, ſays Mr. M.

a rational religion has been the cant term of all who profeſs to be wiſer than others.

With equal truth, honeſty, and diſcernment, Mr. Kett, in his hiſtory, the interpreter of prophecy, brings a like general charge againſt Mr. Locke. In vol. iii. p. 17, 18, edit. i. and vol. ii. p. 131, 132 edit. ii. he ſays, "that Mr. Locke's writings led to a ſcepticiſm, eventually hurtful to religion; and though a loyal ſubject, his political writings generated doctrines hurtful to monarchical government, and indeed to civil ſociety. The Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, in itſelf ſo profound and uſeful, with a conſiderable degree of erroneous theory, as might be expected from a man even of the greateſt genius, exploring untrodden, intricate, and arduous paths, brought a greater acceſſion to man of knowledge of thoſe powers, by which he is peculiarly diſtinguiſhed, than any book that had ever been written. It tended alſo to ſharpen, and invigorate the faculties. But the caution with which it examined different ſpecies and degrees of evidence; a caution right, as far as it merely prevented error, ſometimes refuſed to admit truth, ſought proof of a different kind from that which the nature of the ſubject required, doubted wherein the plain judgment of common ſenſe, no doubt could exiſt, and afforded ſuppoſed data, from whence ingenious men might form the moſt viſionary theories."

It has often been obſerved, that children can aſk queſtions, which the wiſeſt men cannot an-

ſwer; it is no leſs true, that perſons, the moſt ſlightly acquainted with any ſubjects, can bring *general* accuſations, which it may be, no man, however well acquainted with the ſubject can refute. If Mr. Milner, or Mr. Kett had ſpecified particular inſtances, upon which theſe very ſerious accuſations were founded; ſuch charges would then have had a claim to be conſidered as ſomething *more* than *mere* calumnies. But till Mr. Milner's admirers bring *proof where* Mr. Locke introduces a *pompous parade* of *reaſoning* into religion; and till Mr. K. points out that erroneous theory, which, he affirms is to be found in a *conſiderable degree*, in the Eſſay upon the Human Underſtanding; till he ſhews *where* Mr. Locke refuſes to *admit* truth, or ſeeks proof of a *different* kind from that which the *nature* of the ſubject *required*; till he acquaints us where Mr. Locke doubted upon ſubjects, which in the plain judgment of common *ſenſe*, admitted of *no* doubt, and till he points out the matters which afforded data for the theories of viſionary men, and what thoſe writings of Mr. Locke are which *neceſſarily* led to ſcepticiſm, and infidelity; we muſt beg to conſider Mr. Kett as an encourager of the preſent faſhionable political ſlander. For unleſs Mr. Locke's writings *neceſſarily* led to ſcepticiſm, and infidelity, Mr. Locke is no more to be blamed than the inventors of printing are, for all the atheiſtical, profane, obſcene, and treaſonable books, which have ever iſſued from the preſs: by which this noble invention has proved *eventually*

hurtful, not only to religion, but alſo to civil ſocity. Nevertheleſs, however warm Mr. Kett's zeal may be, we truſt, he will not venture to aſſert, that Mr. Locke ever wrote any thing hoſtile to limited monarchy, much leſs will Mr. Kett venture to declare, that *he* thinks *deſpotiſm* preferable to a *free* government.

But let us do Mr. Kett juſtice: all his charges we believe are not imaginary; whether he will have better luck with his *founded*, than with his *unfounded* charges, will ſoon appear. Mr. Kett ſays, that Mr. Locke affirms that we have no *certain* evidence for the exiſtence of any objects, but ourſelves individually, and the Deity.—Mr. Kett cannot mean that Mr. Locke denies the evidence of ſenſe.

This charge then I ſuppoſe Mr. Kett grounds upon the firſt, and ſecond ſections of the eleventh chapter of the fourth book of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. The knowledge of our (own) being, ſays Mr. Locke, we have by intuition. The existence of God, reaſon (arguing from the information of our ſeveral ſenſes, Rom. i. 20.) clearly makes known to us. The knowledge of the exiſtence of all other things we receive only by *actual* ſenſation. Had Mr. Kett attended more cloſely to Mr. Locke's meaning, or had he more clearly underſtood his own, he would never have brought this objection.

The knowledge men are in *general*, and *uſually* poſſeſſed of, ariſes from the exertion of our powers, either of perception, or ſenſation. By our powers

of perception I underſtand thoſe internal faculties of the mind, through whoſe action we are conſcious of our own exiſtence; and by whoſe action we become acquainted with the relations between our ideas; whether ſuch relations are diſcoverable, *immediately* and *intuitively*, or *mediately*, that is, by the interpoſition of other ideas. By the powers of ſenſation, I underſtand thoſe corporeal faculties by which we become acquainted with the works of nature, that is, with the different objects of the material world, and the reſpective effects of theſe objects upon each other, and alſo upon ourſelves. Now the action of theſe powers of ſenſe is confined to our own perſonal preſence; we can receive no information from them reſpecting any objects exiſting, or reſpecting the effects produced by ſuch objects, in places from which we are abſent; and therefore all the proof we can have of the exiſtence and reality of the material world, is confined to the *ſmall* reach of our bodily ſenſes (I conſider not now the trifling aſſiſtance they can receive from art.) Nothing ſo certain as that it is utterly impoſſible that we can have the teſtimony of our ſenſes, for the exiſtence of ſuch objects, as are removed by *diſtance* out of the ſphere of their operation. This teſtimony of ſenſe can continue no longer, than while the ſenſes continue to act. Their teſtimony does, and muſt *ceaſe* with their action. What therefore we are not *ſure* of by the *preſent*, i. e. the exiſting teſtimony of our ſenſes,

may poſſibly be falſe, but what *may* poſſibly be falſe, cannot *neceſſarily* be true, that is, cannot be *certain*. And therefore, whatever becomes of the plain judgment of *common ſenſe*, we muſt doubt of the exiſtence of all ſuch parts of the material world as are not the preſent objects of our ſenſes. For, with reſpect to knowledge, there are only two ſtates of mind, certainty and doubt; and of courſe where the former does not obtain, the latter muſt. But the works of creation, or the effects of theſe works upon each other furniſh all the objects of that ſort of knowledge which we receive through the ſenſes; and therefore this knowledge is a ſtanding and continual proof of the exiſtence of God; which does and muſt attend the (conſtant) action of our ſenſes.

Mr. Kett inſtances, in Berkely and Hume, as ſome of thoſe viſionary writers whoſe fanciful ſyſtems roſe from purſuing Locke's principles. It would have been much more to his purpoſe had he ſhewn *what* theſe principles were, and *how* they led to ſuch ſyſtems. With the ſame attention to *preciſe* proof he quotes Warburton's works *at large*; ſurely in ſuch a voluminous writer he ſhould not only have quoted the *particular* words, but alſo have referred to the particular place where they are to be found. Or is it that he thought with his fellow academic, Dr. Knox, to eſtabliſh truth by the argument of *authority*, juſt as another of his fellow academics thought to eſtabliſh it by the argument of *etymology*.

Mr. Kett tells us, that Mr. Locke contributed more than any other writer to the knowledge of thoſe powers of the human mind, by which mankind are peculiarly diſtinguiſhed. What then is this new faculty which Mr. Kett introduces to us under the title of *common ſenſe*; a faculty which it ſeems prevents, or removes doubts, that cannot be diſpelled by all thoſe wonderful faculties with which Mr. Locke brings us acquainted? What is the object of its action, or the mode of its operation? And wherein does it differ from thoſe other powers of the mind which Mr. Locke ſo clearly explains? Till Mr. Kett is pleaſed to give us ſome more preciſe account of it, than he has yet done, we muſt beg to be excuſed from conſidering it as worthy of attention. Or is Mr. Kett giving us a ſample of it, when at p. 14. Vol. iii. of his firſt edit. or p. 129. Vol. ii. of his ſecond edit. he accuſes certain proteſtant writers of quitting the *ſtrong holds* of Scripture doctrine, and arguing upon what *they* called, the *principles* of *natural* religion. It ſhould ſeem however, as if neither theſe proteſtant writers, nor their corrector, knew much of either the one, or the other. An attention to what is meant by the ſtrong holds of Scripture doctrine, and what by natural religion, would have ſhewn him that the charge was abſurd, becauſe the crime was impoſſible. For what do we mean by natural religion, but the knowledge of *ſuch* truths reſpecting God, as can be collected by human reaſon, from a conſideration of his works? And is it poſſible

that ſuch truths ſhould at all claſh with thoſe truths, which he is pleaſed to *declare*, that is with the doctrines of revelation? And what were theſe principles of natural religion for which Mr. Kett's proteſtant writers ſo injudiciouſly forſook the ſtrong holds of Scripture doctrine! Why the admiſſion "that faith depends not upon the will, but upon the underſtanding," that "when the evidence for the truth of a propoſition is *full* and *clear*, this evidence *conſtrains* aſſent, but that no blame is imputable for rejecting a propoſition for which the mind cannot ſee evidence; and that we are *not* called upon to *believe*, what we *cannot* comprehend." Who theſe proteſtant writers were, who could not ſee the difference between the principles of logic, and thoſe of natural religion I know not; but to whatever ſpecies of knowledge theſe principles may belong, they certainly belong no more to natural religion, than they do to natural philoſophy. If by *faith* you mean the *mere ſimple* act of the underſtanding, expreſſed by the word belief; (abſtracted from all conſideration of the influence, which the ſubject matter of ſuch belief *ought* to have upon the conduct,) the *naked* aſſent of the mind to the truth of a propoſition, not admitting demonſtration, or ſenſible proof: if by the *full* and *clear* evidence for the truth of a propoſition, you mean demonſtration, and if you further mean that men are not blameable for withholding their aſſent to propoſitions, of which no *ſufficient* proof is given; and of *this* ſufficiency they *themſelves* muſt

judge at their *own* peril (for it is *this* circumſtance which conſtitutes a ſtate of trial) nothing certainly can be more true, than theſe aſſertions. And had Mr. Kett's views of *revealed* religion been a whit clearer than thoſe which he ſeems to have of *natural*, or had his knowledge of the powers of the human mind, and their reſpective operations, been as diſtinct, as thoſe perſons ought to have, who take upon them to criticiſe Mr. Locke, he would have better underſtood the nature of what he calls the ſtrong holds of Scripture doctrine, and what the difference of the ideas is which reſpect the very *diſtinct* operations of the mind from which knowledge and belief ariſe. But we will not follow the example of Mr. Kett, in bringing *general* and *unſupported* charges.

One great purpoſe of revelation is, to bring men acquainted with *ſuch* truths, as they are *unable* to diſcover by the *cuſtomary* uſe of their *natural* faculties, or with *ſuch* facts as their *cuſtomary* experience might incline them to disbelieve. Not as Mr. Kett affirms to give them information which they cannot underſtand; yet ſuch muſt be the caſe if men can be called upon, i. e. be under *moral* obligations to *believe* what they *cannot comprehend*. The whole knowledge of revelation is a knowledge of *facts*, or of the conſequences of *theſe* facts. *This* knowledge is *now* conveyed to mankind only through the medium of human language. Can we then believe the truth of theſe facts, or the reality of theſe effects without comprehending the mean-

ing of the words by which theſe truths are conveyed to us? If you ſay we *can*, then all tranſlations of the Scriptures are *needleſs*: for wherefore are they tranſlated, but becauſe men do not underſtand the original tongues, that is, becauſe otherwiſe, men would not be able to comprehend what they are called upon to believe.

Human knowledge is received by ſeveral different ways, and this knowledge is called by different names, according to the different ways by which it is received; but in whatever way it is received, unleſs the ideas of which it is compoſed are clear and diſtinct, it ceaſes to be knowledge, we can learn nothing from ſuch imperfect information. It is juſt the ſame as if the faculties of the mind were *unable* to perceive, or thoſe of the body were incapable of tranſmitting the impreſſions of external objects; or as if we were *ignorant* of the ideas uſually annexed to the words which we hear or ſee.---But further——

The only circumſtance in which theſe various ſorts of knowledge differ from each other, is in the degree of probability naturally attendant upon each ſort. That knowledge therefore which ariſes from our *own* perceptions, and that which we receive from the information of other beings vary only in their probability, which may approach nearer to abſolute certainty than by any aſſigned difference. And the *degree* of probability, attached to each ſort of knowledge, depends, not upon the clearneſs or obſcurity of the ideas compoſing ſuch knowledge,

but upon the manner by which it is received. A lie is not leſs a lie for being more or leſs clearly underſtood. Now certain knowledge ariſes from our perceptions *only*, whether *internal* or *external*; it wholly depends upon the *accuracy* of our *natural* powers; but probable knowledge (which ariſes chiefly from the information of others, and is the peculiar ſubject of faith, built upon mere human teſtimony) depends not upon the ſtrength of our original powers, i. e. of thoſe powers which our Creator has given us, ſo much as upon our acquired dexterity in the uſe of them: and judgment is that operation of the mind by which we eſtimate the *value* of probability. For judgment is not a faculty of the mind, but, like attention and conſideration, an act of the underſtanding. The perceptive faculties then, i. e. our original powers, enable us to *diſcern* the various circumſtances upon which the probability of events depends, and by the judgment we are enabled to eſtimate the value of this probability. But we can no more eſtimate the value of probability, than we can diſcern the circumſtances upon which it depends, unleſs the ideas relating to both theſe matters, are *clear* and diſtinct, that is, unleſs we comprehend them. It is impoſſible therefore to exerciſe any act of faith about matters of which we are intirely ignorant: *ſome* knowledge we muſt have; but though this knowledge may be more, or leſs particular, yet it muſt be clear, and we cannot believe any farther than it is ſo; that is, we can *no more* believe, than *we can* know what we do *not*

comprehend. An inſtance will explain this matter. All perſons, who are convinced of the truth of the Scriptures, muſt believe that Jeſus is the Son of God; yet no perſon believes that Jeſus is the Son of God in the *ſame way* that he believes, every man-child born into the world, is the ſon of his father. This *no* perſon believes, becauſe *every* perſon *knows* it to be impoſſible, in the literal ſenſe of the words, according to all human acceptation. But we believe not what we *cannot* comprehend, but what we perfectly can: that as children derive their exiſtence, not from any act of their own, but from their parents, ſo Chriſt derived his exiſtence from God, John v. 26. Thus faith is ἔλεγχος πραγμάτων οὐ βλεπομένων---the proof of *matters* which are *not* objects of ſenſe to us, and which therefore admit of no other proof than teſtimony. But teſtimony which we can not underſtand, that is, information which we cannot comprehend, is no information at all. 1 Cor. xiv. 11.

Such however is the force of prejudice, aided by confuſed and imperfect knowledge, that many good perſons are perſuaded, that both themſelves, and others *believe*, what they *cannot* comprehend. Yet is there juſt as much difference between believing the truth, i. e. the reality of a matter of fact, and believing the *way* by which ſuch matter of fact has been brought to paſs, as there is between experiencing our *own belief* of a matter of fact, and experiencing the *fact* itſelf. When therefore our belief of the creation is urged as an inſtance of our believ-

ing what we do not comprehend, becauſe we do not comprehend *how*, or by *what particular* means, God made the world, the argument has no force. Becauſe though all perſons believe that God made the world, no perſons believe *how*, or by what particular means, he made it. But it is *that* matter *only* which we do not comprehend. We know the world exiſts by the teſtimony of our ſenſes; and we know from reaſon that things cannot create themſelves, that being to act, *before* they had the power of acting. He therefore who built all things is GOD.

Juſt in the ſame way as theſe good people cannot ſee the difference between believing the exiſtence of a matter of fact, and believing the way *by which* this exiſtence is produced; ſo neither can they ſee the difference between the information communicated by poſitive, or by (what are called) negative ideas. (See Hey's Norriſian Lectures, Vol. III. Book IV. Introduction to Part II. Sect. vii. p. 124.) Yet from this latter ſort of information we do not learn what a thing *is*, but what it *is not*. A very ſcanty ſpecies of knowledge indeed! But upon the ground of this imaginary knowledge it has been ſaid, "you believe that God is a ſpirit, that is, you believe what you cannot comprehend. To be ſure no perſon comprehends what a ſpirit is, the term ſpirit conveys only a negative idea. A ſpirit hath *not* fleſh and bones. But though you do not comprehend what a ſpirit

is, neither do you *believe* what a ſpirit is: you only believe what it is *not*; it is not any ſuch matter as you are acquainted with; and this you *fully* comprehend. You believe God does not conſiſt of any ſuch matter as you are acquainted with. Can any thing be more intelligible?

But it is not merely a want of *clear* ideas, and *preciſe* knowledge, a common, but utterly groundleſs prejudice, reſpecting the nature of myſteries, has contributed not a little to eſtabliſh this notion of the poſſibility of believing what we cannot comprehend; i. e. what is unintelligible. It has been imagined that myſteries, *as* myſteries, made a *neceſſary* part of revealed religion; as if it was *requiſite*, that revelation ſhould never be *without* ſome parts unintelligible, and incomprehenſible to the human underſtanding. But though it is reaſonable to expect that we ſhould be left ignorant of many things both in the works, and the word of God; and though many important ends may be anſwered, by things being kept ſecret for *ſome time*, yet what benefit can poſſibly ariſe from ſecrets which are *never* to be revealed? It cannot therefore be of the eſſence of a myſtery that it ſhould *never* be diſcloſed: for that is to make it eſſential to a myſtery that it ſhould be *uſeleſs*. And we may obſerve, that *this* word is moſt uſually applied in Scripture to matters which *once* were ſecrets, but which for certain important reaſons are *now* revealed, Matt. xiii. 11. Rom. xi. 25. xvi. 25. Eph. iii. 4.*

* A fondneſs for the deluſive moon-ſhine of imagination, and an averſion to the *clear* and *ſtrong* light of reaſon, ſo conſpicuous in many

A want of ability to perceive the difference, between *original* and *transmitted* revelation, and the metaphorical expression, the *word* of *God*, affectedly applied to the Scriptures,* has occasioned many persons to ascribe the same authority to the writings of inspired men, as is due to the *immediate*, and if I may so say, *personal* declarations of God himself; and it has been asked respecting the *present* assurance of faith, "what then, does not the evidence of God carry *certainty* along with it? Undoubtedly it does. God has unquestionably given information to particular persons, at sundry times, and in divers manners; in dreams, and visions, and by an audible voice, as well as by the

pious persons, leads them equally aside from the truth in contrary directions. Thus while some are so eager to make mysteries a necessary part of revelation, others write as if they meant to discard every thing of that kind from *it*; and so the author of the Horæ Solitariæ deduces almost all the peculiarities of Christianity from the verbal expressions of the *Jewish* Scriptures; insomuch that the antient Jews (if they understood their own mother tongue as well as this author) must have been very little behind the Apostles (even after the descent of the Holy Ghost) in their knowledge of Christian salvation. And though Paul profited in the knowledge of the Mosaic economy above many of his own countrymen, and though he received his knowledge of the Christian dispensation from the author of it, Gal. i. 12. yet must he have been strangely mistaken when he asserts that what he spoke was the *hidden* wisdom of God, which in other ages was *not* made *known* to (any of) the sons of men; if it be true (as this author asserts) that our present very imperfect knowledge of the Hebrew tongue is sufficient to prove the very contrary.

* All that any man (says Dr. Hey, Norrisian Lectures, B. I. Chap. i. Sect. 6. & Chap. xii. Sect. 14. parag. 2. in vol. I. pages 4, & 111. & B. IV. Introduction to Part 2d. Sect. 14. p. 131) should really be understood to mean, when he speaks of the word of God, is human interpretations of it.

What then is the word W. God has magnified above all his names?

incomprehenſible mode of ſecret inſpiration. But in all theſe caſes, they who received ſuch information, received, we may be ſure, unqueſtionable *marks* of the divinity of it, though we are, and muſt be ignorant of the nature of *theſe* marks. For had not this been the caſe, every idle fancy of folly, and every extravagant freak of enthuſiaſm might have paſſed for divine revelation. At preſent however we know of no other mark by which we can be aſſured that we receive truth upon the *immediate* evidence of God, but that it has been miraculouſly conveyed to us. We may indeed reaſonably preſume that words ſpoken to us by God himſelf, muſt be free from all uncertainty, becauſe God not only clearly knows what Himſelf means; He alſo knows *as* clearly, whether his communication is *perfectly* underſtood; but this cannot be the caſe with knowledge communicated by any other being, ſince God *alone* knoweth the thoughts. But when original revelation is tranſmitted to us by uninſpired men (and in theſe days we have no other) by the *uſual* mode of human communication, i. e. by human language, ſuch information muſt (without a miracle) partake of all the imperfections, and uncertainty, of this imperfect, and uncertain mode of communication.

Mr. Kett thinks himſelf juſtified, if *not* in the *truth* at leaſt in the *propriety* of bringing theſe charges againſt Mr. Locke, by the authority of Warburton and Mackintoſh, who Mr. Kett affirms, (p. 17. Vol. iii. edit. i. or p. 131. Vol. ii. edit. ii.) juſtly

obſerve, "that we cannot exceed the bounds preſcribed for human knowledge, without involving ourſelves in contradiction and abſurdity: that nothing has produced more pernicious miſchief to ſociety, than the purſuit of principles in themſelves good, far beyond the bounds, in which they are good." Now what are we to underſtand in this place by principles? Not principles of *mere* knowledge ſurely! Theſe may be *true*, or *falſe*; but whoever thought of intuitive truths, which is what we uſually mean by principles being *good* or *bad?* Not principles of morality! For theſe, if good, muſt for *ever* continue to be good. There are no bounds, or limits to what is fit, right, proper, commendable, praiſe-worthy in *itſelf*, after which it becomes unfit, wrong, improper, wicked, deteſtable, abominable. When we deſcribe moral principles as *right* in *themſelves*, we mean that they are *eternally* right, that they do not admit of any change. That truth, juſtice, humanity, honeſty, cannot become falſehood, fraud, cruelty, knavery, how far ſoever carried. Or are we to ſuppoſe that theſe authors meant, what *alone can* be meant, principles of *expediency* or *utility*; all this may be very true, but is very trifling. Becauſe who ſees not that the general benefit of mankind muſt depend upon a great variety of circumſtances, for which no *fixed* rule can poſſibly be given?

But what are *theſe bounds* preſcribed for human knowledge? and who has preſcribed them? The

powers of the human mind are certainly not unlimited, but who can ſay what theſe limits are? Ideas ſuggeſted by external objects, and theſe ideas variouſly modified by the different faculties of the underſtanding, are the materials of all our knowledge; and where ideas are either abſolutely wanting, or are much confuſed, and very obſcure, we ſhall either have no knowledge at all, or it will be exceedingly imperfect; which of theſe two is the caſe with Meſſrs. Milner and Kett, the public muſt determine; and thoſe who can find out Mr. Locke's faults by the light ſuch writers afford, muſt have good eyes indeed.

Mr. Kett has alſo recourſe to teſtimony for the proof of the miſchiefs generated by Mr. Locke's miſtakes; and when he *produces* this teſtimony, or thoſe miſtakes upon which this teſtimony is founded, it will be time enough to conſider of a reply to ſuch vague, *confuſed* and unmeaning, accuſations.

Dr. Napleton, in his advice to ſtudents in divinity, follows not a little the practice of Meſſrs. Milner and Kett; and at p. 34, warns thoſe who read Mr. Locke's Theological writings, "to be cautious how they follow his opinions in ſuch paſſages of Scripture as relate to the divinity of our Lord, or the aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit." He would have done more credit to the *fairneſs* of his advice, if he had pointed out the exceptionable paſſages, and to the *value* of it, if he had pointed

out his reaſons for thinking theſe paſſages exceptionable.

Biſhop Horne alſo has thought proper to controvert Mr. Locke's notions of civil government; but he has done it, as all honeſt inquirers after truth ought to do, by endeavouring to ſhew the falſity of Mr. Locke's reaſoning; with what ſucceſs the readers of this defence of Mr. Locke, muſt determine.

The Biſhop begins his Diſcourſe upon the Origin of civil government, with obſerving, "that it is a natural, and a laudable curioſity to inquire into the origin of civil government, and to know at *what* time, and under *whoſe* direction, an inſtitution was deviſed capable of contributing ſo much to the production, furtherance, and eſtabliſhment of human happineſs." It would be a curioſity equally natural, and equally laudable, to inquire into, and aſcertain, at *what* time, and under whoſe direction, the various arts of life, which contribute ſo much to the comfort and well being of mankind were *invented*, and by *whom* they were brought to their preſent ſtate of perfection. And is not each of theſe inquiries equally practicable? And does not the nature and conſtitution of this world plainly ſhew, that both are alike impoſſible? Not only the *conſtitution* of that *nature*, which God has unalterably appointed, is a progreſſive one; that ſtate of happineſs alſo, which mankind are enabled to attain, by the exertion of thoſe faculties which God has given them, is likewiſe a progreſſive ſtate.

The productions of nature can no more reach that degree of perfection they are capable of at *once*, or of a ſudden, than the habits and diſpoſitions of the moral, the wiſdom of the intellectual, or the dexterity and addreſs of the active world. Time and labour, and cultivation, muſt mature the firſt; attention, diligence, and repeated efforts muſt complete the laſt. Whatever the ſtate of our firſt parents, of the animal, vegetable, and material world might be, it was, and muſt be totally different, from that of each individual thing, which was to ſucceed. The *origin* of a ſtate of nature, and the *continuance* of *that* ſtate, have nothing in common. The firſt was a miracle, not to be repeated; the ſecond, though no leſs wonderful, loſes the name of miracle, from its continual repetition. We know no more how the natural and moral world were ſet agoing, than we know how the planets were projected in their orbits, and you might juſt as well ask when an acorn became an oak, a child a man, or when London became a city, as to ask at *what* time, and under whoſe direction civil government was eſtabliſhed? The Britiſh government is univerſally and deſervedly admired; but who can ſay *when*, and under whoſe direction it was, or whether it is even *yet* eſtabliſhed? It has received gradual improvements and amendments, through a long courſe of year's, and will probably continue to do ſo pro re nata. Its various excellencies were attained by ſlow degrees, and are no more the worſe for being the

fruit of ſtrife and contention, than the religion of Chriſt is, Philip. i. 15. and provided the happineſs of mankind is but promoted, we have unqueſtionable cauſe to rejoice, and as lovers of our country may ſay with the Apoſtle, "yea and we will rejoice." To take an inſtance in our own memory. During the long adminiſtration of Sir Robert Walpole, whenever the miniſter was teaſed with a troubleſome pamphlet, he uſed to ſend his myrmidons with a *general* warrant to ſearch the printing-offices for treaſonable papers; not indeed with the hopes, or even the expectations of finding any, but merely to plague the *oppoſition* printers, by overturning their *caſes* and making *pye* of their *letter*; becauſe he had nothing upon which he could ground a legal proceſs. But theſe *general* warrants have ſince been declared *illegal*, and now no miniſter dares to iſſue them, and we may venture to predict never will. The Biſhop indeed ſpeaks of civil ſociety as if it was the invention of an hour, or the work of a day. For, who that thought otherwiſe, would expect to aſcertain "at *what* time, and under whoſe direction, a machine was conſtructed capable, by a variety of well adjuſted ſprings and movements, of controlling the irregularities of depraved nature, &c. and ſecuring to us the numerous benefits of government."

Ariſtocratic and democratic forms of government, the Biſhop tells us are *illegitimate* forms of government.—No law ſurely but that of God can

ordain a form of government for *all* mankind. Theſe friends of the good Biſhop then, who thought his Sermon worth republiſhing in that wiſe compilation, called the Scholar Armed, would be kind to his memory and his reputation, if they would tell us in what part of the Bible theſe forms are declared to be illegitimate; and alſo in what part of it a deſcription of that legitimate form is to be found, which the Biſhop and his friends ſeem ſo anxious to eſtabliſh. Whether his, and their anxiety aroſe from a deſire to derive every thing from a religious original, juſt as certain other pious perſons were anxious to derive all arts and ſciences, from the Bible, I know not; but conſidering how very careful good perſons often are of their own intereſt, it would not be ſtrange, if having heard of that celebrated maxim, "no biſhop, no king," they might be apprehenſive, the converſe ſhould be no leſs true. However when theſe friends of his Lordſhip can ſhew where directions for this legitimate form of government are to be found in the word of God, I will undertake to anſwer thoſe queſtions which the Biſhop aſks with ſuch an air of triumph, viz. *Where* the univerſal aſſembly was convened? and who had authority to convene it? and how the proceedings of this aſſembly were regulated, &c. &c.?*

* Had the Biſhop's underſtanding been as good as his diſpoſitions he would have ſeen, that when writers on *moral* ſubjects (meaning by moral ſubjects, ſuch ſubjects as reſpect the conduct of mankind) deſcribe the manner in which ſuch conduct may be attained: they do not mean to deſcribe the conduct which *actually*, and in fact prevails, but ſuch as would prevail, were men governed by their reaſon,

To fathers in their private families, ſays the Biſhop, after Mr. Hooker (whom by the by with the uſual honeſty of polemical writers, he can either quote, or paſs over in ſilence, as beſt ſuits his purpoſe) nature has given ſupreme power.

judging, from the nature, and faculties their Creator has given them, and the ſituation and circumſtances in which he has placed them. Juſt as mathematicians, when they demonſtrate the various properties of different figures, mean only to ſhew the *relations* between certain *ideas*. For theſe relations no longer obtain when you paſs from *abſtract* ideas to *real* exiſtence. Not a ſingle propoſition in Euclid is true of a triangle drawn upon paper, or cut out of any material whatſoever; that is, when from ideas in the mind they become objects of our corporeal ſenſes. It is unqueſtionably true that the three angles of a triangle are *exactly* equal to two right ones. But draw the figure, and the propoſition, as referred to *that* figure, or to any triangular figure, in which matter is concerned, is no longer true. Thus again we are told, that "by the firſt law of motion, a body when acted upon by a ſingle impulſe, will continue to move uniformly *for ever*, and will *for ever* perſevere in its *original* direction. Yet when this law is applied to matter *actually* exiſting, it *ceaſes* to be true. Nobody ever ſaw *ſuch* motion. So again, when Sir Iſaac Newton diſcovered that the moon's motion was of the *like* kind, that it would be, if the *law* of gravitation, obſervable upon the *ſurface* of the *earth*, reached to that planet; he did not mean to aſſert, that gravitation was the *cauſe* of the moon's motion; becauſe for aught any one can tell, an angel may carry it about, but he meant to ſhew that ſuch a force would produce the *ſame* effect. And when writers aſſert certain matters relative to civil government, or church authority, they do not mean to aſſert, that civil government, or church authority, *actually* aroſe from ſuch circumſtances, but that theſe circumſtances would certainly produce *ſuch* civil government and ſuch church authority, as in the want of either, would anſwer the ends *propoſed* by *ſuch* inſtitutions.

Proofs that matters *can* ariſe from certain circumſtances may be derived from abſtract reaſoning, proofs, that matters *actually did* ariſe from certain circumſtances, can only be derived from our *own* experience, or from *that* of others, made known to us by their teſtimony. Thoſe therefore who aſſert that the writers upon civil ſociety have contributed to the madneſs of French philoſophy, miſunderſtand the nature of the reaſoning employed by theſe writers.

Nature! The God of nature ſurely! The term nature is a *mere* word, and when we talk of the gifts of nature, we mean thoſe gifts of God, thoſe powers, faculties, qualifications, qualities, which he beſtows *indiſcriminately*, though perhaps not equally upon all the various ſpecies of beings reſpectively: and from conſidering theſe various natural powers, faculties, &c. we collect the purpoſes they were intended to anſwer, and of courſe the end for which they were given: and this is the *great* and *general* argument of final cauſes from which moſt of our knowledge is derived. What then, I aſk, are the purpoſes for which this ſupreme power is given? and why is it given by *nature* to fathers *only*, and not to mothers? and how does it appear that this power is given to *one* parent *only*? and what are we to underſtand by *ſupreme power*? If I have any ideas to the words ſupreme power, it means the higheſt poſſible degree of power, which can be exerciſed over whatever is the object of it. Now the higheſt degree of power which human creatures can exerciſe over living beings is, the power of life and death. What then are thoſe circumſtances of mankind, from which we are to conclude, that *nature* gives *this ſupreme* power, i. e. the power of *life* and *death* over their offſpring to fathers in their private families? what is the uſe of ſuch a power, and why is it given to the father only, and not to the mother? of whom the Biſhop ſays nothing!

Or is it meant only to ſhew that *ſome ſort* of

power does, and muſt exiſt amongſt mankind? But whatever power may exiſt amongſt men, natural reaſon, and divine revelation equally ſhew that it cannot be the *right* (for that is what we mean in the preſent caſe by the word power) of life and death, except in the caſe of ſelf-defence. In civil ſociety indeed men may agree to eſtabliſh any puniſhment for offences againſt the *State* (ſuch are all crimes in the proper ſenſe of the word) which they may think proper. Becauſe all puniſhments for *crimes* are upon the ground of *ſelf-defence*, nor can ſuch an agreement be unjuſt. *Public* puniſhments when not inflicted upon the innocent, may be *harſh*, or *cruel*, but they cannot be *unjuſt*. But what is all this to the eſtabliſhment of civil power? a power inſtituted for very different purpoſes, than thoſe of fathers in their private families. Political and paternal power differ ſo *much* in the *ends* to be anſwered by them, that no inference can be made, nor any concluſion drawn from one to the other. A father may bring up his children in what religion he pleaſes; and he has this power (right) if he has it any way by *nature*. But may a king provide ſuch religion for his ſubjects as he thinks proper, and *compel* them to receive it? Indeed nothing but the utmoſt ignorance of human nature, and the ſtrongeſt prejudice could make any perſon entertain a notion that civil government, can have any *other end* than the temporal benefit of mankind; or any other foundation, than the *actual* or *tacit* conſent, (whatever

the motives to ſuch conſent may be) of thoſe, who for their *general* intereſt, ſubmit to it.

What work men made, when the faſhion was to determine the *origin* and *form* of civil government, the extent of authority, and the degree of ſubjection due to it, (not from the reaſons of things, the laws of our common nature, the practice of particular nations, the tempers, character, and diſpoſitions of mankind in different ages and countries but) from precepts, and precedents, ſuppoſed to be contained in the Bible, will, one ſhould think, never be forgotten in *this* nation. And what could follow from ſo injudicious an appeal to, and ſo abſurd an application of holy ſcripture, than what did follow, confuſion and ſtrife, and every evil work? For while *one* party eſteemed monarchy the appointment of God, and princes the Lord's anointed, the other concluded from the *ſame* authority, and therefore with *equal* reaſon, that kings were given by God in his anger to ſcourge the folly of the people who deſired them. But an impartial reader of the ſcriptures muſt have *clearly* perceived, how little ground there is in them for ſuch deciſions: becauſe we no where find any thing more than *general* exhortations to ſubmit to government, to honour magiſtrates, to be obedient to laws: all theſe matters are the duties of ſubjects---not a word of the duties of governors; and have they therefore no duties? Nor is the leaſt hint given in the word of God, that any particular form is either more *preferable* to others, or more

acceptable to him. We no where find any deſcriptions of the ſeveral orders of magiſtrates; any notices of the particular powers with which they ſhould be inveſted; any declarations by whoſe conſent or authority the laws ſhould be eſtabliſhed, or annulled, altered, or executed. And what is of no leſs importance, (though very ſeldom attended to) viz. that had the form of civil government been thus *expreſsly* appointed of God, it muſt either have admitted of *no defects*, or *no remedies* for them. The conſtitution of the Engliſh government is deſervedly eſteemed the moſt excellent in the world; but could this judicious Biſhop, or can his equally judicious admirers find a limited monarchy in the Bible? This conſtitution has arrived at this high degree of excellence by *numerous*, *ſlow*, and *repeated alterations*, all which, were monarchy, the appointment of God, would, *without* the *ſame* appointment, have been utterly ſinful.—So much for the political abilities of thoſe zealous perſons who thought fit to countenance this courtly publication of the Scholar Armed: their republication of Mr. Willat's Sermon againſt the Religion of Nature, is an equal proof of their knowledge, and diſcernment.

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

IT is one thing to enquire into the nature of the *effects* produced by our mental powers, or into the conſequences of the operations of our intellectual faculties, and quite another matter to enquire, *how* theſe powers act, or by *what means* theſe effects are produced. Mr. Locke, therefore, with a ſagacity ſimilar to that of another great genius, Sir Iſaac Newton, "wiſely declined, B. I. Chap. i. Sect. 2. medling with the phyſical conſideration of the mind, or troubling himſelf to examine wherein its *eſſence* conſiſts, or by what *motions* of the *ſpirits*, or *alterations* of our *bodies*, we come to have any ſenſation by our organs, or any ideas in our underſtandings, and whether thoſe ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter, &c." Yet he ſays, B. II. Chap. viii. Sect. 4. "that were he *inclined* to *enquire* into the *natural cauſes*, and *manner* of *perception*, he ſhould endeavour to ſhew how ſenſation, that is, ideas may be produced in us by external objects; viz. by *different degrees* and *modes* of *motion* in our *animal ſpirits*, variouſly agitated by theſe external objects." This motion he ſuppoſes, Sect. 12. muſt be continued from theſe objects to the brain, *there* to produce in our minds the different ideas of ſuch objects. And he goes on, Ibid. "but ſince bodies of an *obſervable* bigneſs *can* be perceived (by the ſenſes) at a diſtance," (that is, ſince bodies that can be perceived—*can* be perceived) "and

ſince *no* ſuch bodies are ever perceived to paſs from theſe objects to the brain; therefore," ſays Mr. Locke, it is *evident* that theſe bodies, which come from external objects to the brain, are—*imperceptible*:" and ſo it ſeems we have the evidence of *ſenſe* for what is imperceptible—that is for what ſuch evidence cannot poſſibly be had. But in Chap. xiv. Sect. 13. of this ſecond Book he ſays, " that *not* knowing how the ideas of our minds are *framed*, of what *materials* they are *made*, whence they have their *light*, and *how* they come to make their appearance, he can give *no other* reaſon for theſe phænomena than that in *fact* they are ſo, ſee B. IV. Ch. iii. ſ. 11, 12, 13, 14. alſo Chap. vi. & x. ſ. 19. and this ſeems to be about as far as the human underſtanding can penetrate into this ſubject.

Whether Dr. Reid of Glaſgow was diſguſted with this unintelligible philoſophy (as it is ſometimes called) I know not, but he profeſſes to make his inquiry into the human mind upon the principles of *common ſenſe*; yet what he underſtands by common ſenſe, or what he wiſhes his readers to underſtand by this word he does not inform us. He tells us indeed, Ch. i. ſ. 1. and with great truth, " that there is but *one* way to the knowledge of nature's works, the way of *obſervation* and *experiment*; and this great diſcovery, owing to the ſagacity of a moſt *uncommon* genius, is one of Dr. Reid's maxims of *common ſenſe*: yet at the beginning of his ſecond ſection he aſſures us, " that to attend accurately to the operations of our own minds, and to make them an object of thought, is *no eaſy* matter to the *contemplative*; and to the *bulk* of *mankind* is next to impoſſible." And ſo it ſeems *this common* ſenſe is very uncommon.

Common ſenſe indeed can only conſiſt of the *common* obſervations of *common* men, that is, of the bulk of mankind; collected it may be *without much*, perhaps

without *any* conſideration and reflexion: and by philoſophical knowledge can only be meant ſuch knowledge (however lightly the Doctor may deem of it) as is alone attained by much attention, conſideration, and reflexion. For conſideration and reflexion can obtain only in conſequence of habits of thinking; and a want of common ſenſe does not imply lunacy, as the Doctor ſeems to think, but a *weakneſs* of the *perceptive* and *diſcriminating* powers.

Thoſe then who know the advantages of clear notions and diſtinct knowledge; and thoſe who know how much attention, conſideration, and reflexion contribute to clear notions, and diſtinct knowledge, will alſo know how to appreciate the reſpective values of philoſophical and common ſenſe.

Had the Doctor propoſed to make his inquiry into the (nature and powers of the) human mind upon the principles of *common ſenſation*, (or as Mr. Locke ſpeaks, B. I. Chap. i. ſ. 2. by conſidering the diſcerning faculties of a man, as they are *employed* about the objects they have to do with) comprehending under this expreſſion of common ſenſation, the *whole* of our perceptions, both *internal* and *external*, he would certainly have been nearer the mark, but then he would not have appeared to have been any wiſer than Mr. Locke, a matter he ſeems not a little deſirous of.

Mr. Profeſſor Dugald Stewart in his Outlines of Moral Philoſophy ſays nothing of the principles upon which he makes his inquiry, into the nature and powers of the human mind, but he begins very judiciouſly with conſidering *that faculty* by which we receive information of the operations of its ſeveral *powers*, from the exerciſe of *which we can* alone collect its nature. This information we can receive *only* through our own conſciouſneſs, and can communicate to other men *only* by the uſe of *language*. Now this *internal* experience of

what paſſes in our own mind, differs intirely from that experience which we receive through our *ſenſes* of what paſſes in the world about us; namely, from the experience ſuggeſted to us by the action, or as it is ſometimes called, by the impreſſion of external objects upon our corporeal ſenſes. For the *reality* of our experience which relates to the effects of external objects upon our bodily ſenſes, can be aſcertained to *other* men by ſubjecting theſe *ſame* objects to *their* ſenſes. But we have *no way* of aſcertaining the reality of our own conſciouſneſs, that is, the reality of our own internal perceptions, by which we can prove, that what we allege is not *mere imagination*. Thus, the apoſtles and prophets were *conſcious* of the truth conveyed to their minds by divine inſpiration, and they were conſcious that the truth *ſo* conveyed to them, was conveyed by God Himſelf: but when it was neceſſary to aſcertain to *other* men this inſpiration, that is, the *reality* of this *alledged* conſciouſneſs, they were empowered to work miracles in atteſtation of their allegation.

Conſciouſneſs is an inſeparable concomitant of all operations of every mental faculty as Mr. Stewart obſerves, at the *time* of ſuch *operation*; but what Mr. S. does not obſerve, this conſcioulneſs is often continued to the individual through life. Yet is conſciouſneſs as different from memory, as memory is different from imagination, although Doctor Reid confounds them together, ſee Chap. i. ſ. 2. and affirms that they are the *ſame*. We find a ſimilar confuſion of ideas in Mr. Stewart's Philoſophy of the human mind, in page 133. 8vo. Chap. iii. who in the ſame manner confounds memory, and what he calls conception together. He there tells us "that by conception he means *that* power of the mind which enables us to form a notion of an *abſent* object of perception, or of ſenſation. I do not contend he ſays that this is *excluſively* the proper mean-

ing of the word, but I think the faculty which I have now defined (deſcribed he ſhould have ſaid, had he known the difference between a *definition* and a *deſcription)* deſerves to be diſtinguiſhed by an appropriated name." To be ſure if we mean to diſcourſe intelligibly upon the powers of the human mind, every diſtinct faculty muſt have an *appropriated* name. Mr. S. goes on " conception is often confounded with other powers. When a painter makes a picture of a friend who is abſent or dead, he is *commonly* ſaid to paint from *memory*, and the expreſſion is ſufficiently correct for *common converſation.*" Every body I believe but this Profeſſor would think it ſufficiently correct for *philoſophical accuracy.* " But ſays Mr. S. in the analyſis of the mind there is ground for diſtinction. Certainly there is and therefore I diſtinguiſh between memory and conception, as well as between memory and conſciouſneſs." The power of conception enables the painter," Mr. S. tells us, " to make the features of his friend an object of thought, ſo as to copy the reſemblance," and he adds the power of *memory* recogniſes the features as a former object of perception," the power of memory both in the painter and in all who knew the countenance of the perſon pourtrayed. Mr. S. goes on " every act of memory includes an idea of the paſt. Conception implies *no* idea of time," no more does the exerciſe of many other faculties of the human mind. Now comes the concluſion " Thus the word (the *act* the profeſſor means of) conception correſponds to what the ſchoolmen call, *ſimple apprehenſion.* Strange that a learned profeſſor ſhould thus bewilder himſelf. A little cloſe attention and clear reflexion would have ſhewn him that the mind has a power of recalling ſuch ideas as have *once* been the object of its thoughts; and as no idea is ever preſented to the mind *ſingle* and *alone*, it can ſeparate *theſe collections* of ideas, which have thus been preſented by external objects

together, or, in company with each other, and can conſider *any one*, without attending to any other: thus it can conſider the idea of whiteneſs, whether it be preſented to the ſight from a ſwan, from ſnow, from milk, or from any other object. And as the mind can ſeparate the various ideas received in *company*, it can alſo make *arbitrary combinations* of theſe ideas at pleaſure, according to the Poet

> Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
> Jungere ſi velit, et varias inducere plumas,
> *Undique collatis membris*, ut turpiter atrum
> Deſinat in piſcem, mulier formoſa ſuperne.

And wherefore is this picture introduced? not to ſhew the abſurdity of memory, which *cannot* be abſurd, but to ſhew the abſurdity of conception, that is, of imagination which *can*. Again, conceive, ſays a mathematician, a curve line,—conceive that it returns into itſelf—conceive a point to be taken within the curve, and conceive this point to be placed at an equal diſtance from every part of the curve. By this arbitrary combination of ideas, he forms a curve of a particular ſort, that is, having particular relations, from which ariſe properties peculiar to this curve; all which he can deduce from this arbitrary combination of ideas.

In like manner had Dr. Reid attended to the two faculties of memory and conſciouſneſs, he muſt, one ſhould think, have ſeen the difference; becauſe we are *conſcious* of the *preſent* acts of our own minds, but we *can* only *remember* what is *paſt*. Common ſenſe, of which he is ſo fond, might have informed him, that we *cannot* remember what is *preſent*.

The confuſion of ideas indeed, which prevails in both theſe Scottiſh Profeſſors, is truly wonderful. In Chap. ii. ſ. 4. & 5, Dr. Reid confounds belief, know-

ledge, and judgment together. At page 30 he tells us, that ſenſation and remembrance are natural principles of belief: at p. 34, 35, 37 he conſiders belief and knowledge as the *ſame* act of the mind. Yet no two acts of the mind can be more *different*, or more *diſtinct* from each other. Whatever truth admits of *intuitive*, or *demonſtrative*, or *ſenſible* evidence, is *knowledge*; ſuch truth is *certain:* whatever truth does *not* admit of one, or the other, of *theſe ſorts* of proof, is a matter of belief. Whatever is only believed, upon mere human teſtimony, *may* be falſe, whatever is *known muſt* be *true.* Knowledge produces *certainty*; belief only produces probability. The *aſſent* of the mind to knowledge is *unlimited* and *unalterable.* The aſſent of the mind to matters of belief is neither unlimited, nor unalterable. There may ariſe *reaſons* for *retracting* our aſſent to the latter; it is impoſſible that any reaſons can ariſe for retracting our aſſent to the former. In the caſe of knowledge we *actually* perceive by the *uſe* of our *own* faculties, the relations between our ideas in the caſe of belief, we rely upon the perceptions of other men, or rather upon the account they are pleaſed to give us, of their perceptions.

With a like confuſion in his ideas, Mr. Stewart talks of the *belief* with which *conſciouſneſs* is attended. See Outlines, S. 1. Art. 9. He would not have talked in this manner if he had attended to the difference between knowledge and belief. The information received from *all* experience, whether it be the experience we have of the *ſtate* of our own minds ariſing from internal conſciouſneſs; or the experience we have of the ſtate of external objects ariſing from *their* effect upon our corporeal ſenſes, is attended with certainty: for if we cannot rely upon this information, the attainment of certain knowledge is impoſſible: but belief is not attended with certainty. Belief therefore, and

knowledge cannot, as Mr. S. aſſerts, Outlines, S. 1. Art. 9, reſt upon the *ſame* foundation.—By judgment we mean the power of *eſtimating* the probability of any matters propoſed to our belief. It has nothing to do with knowledge or certainty.

In page 212 of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, edit. 8vo, 1802, Mr. S. ſpeaks of the *inſtinctive* principle, *directed* in its operation by the *experience* of the individual. If I underſtand the ſenſe of the word *inſtinct*, it means that *diſpoſition* in the animal world, which leads the different ſorts of living creatures, not only to *purſue* and *attain conſtantly*, and *regularly certain ends*, but to *accompliſh* this attainment, by a *ſpecific*, and *uniform* mode of doing it.

In Chap. ii. ſect. 5. of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, the Doctor ſeems to apprehend that much miſchief may ariſe from any endeavours to aſcertain the meaning of the words we uſe. It is not a little wonderful that a man who appears to have thought *ſo much*, ſhould have conſidered *ſo little*, the only uſeful purpoſe of thinking; viz. that of attaining and communicating clear notions, and preciſe knowledge: and that he ſhould not have been able to ſee, that it muſt be abſolutely impoſſible to make any, the leaſt advances in ſcience, unleſs we affix clear and diſtinct ideas to the words we uſe. Yet he tells us, in the ſection before us, that it is happy no man pretends to define ſenſation and conſciouſneſs; for that thoſe who have defined, and explained belief, have contributed to the production of the moſt incredible paradoxes.

At page 11. the Doctor tells us that Des Cartes inferred *his own* exiſtence from the poſſeſſion of his power of thinking; and the Doctor inquires from *what* that philoſopher inferred his poſſeſſion of the power of thinking? Was it the Doctor aſks from conſciouſneſs? and he further aſks how a man can *know*, that his con-

ſciouſneſs does not deceive him? and I aſk how a man can *know* that his corporeal ſenſes does not deceive him? becauſe unleſs we can rely upon our *internal* perceptions, and our *external* ſenſations, for the *certainty* of their information, all knowledge is impoſſible.

At page 26, the Doctor talks of that ſenſe, whoſe objects are *leaſt* in danger of being miſtaken for *other things*. What are we to underſtand by theſe words "other things?" Is there any ſenſe whoſe objects are *leaſt* in danger of being miſtaken for the objects of other ſenſes? The objects of every ſenſe are as diſtinct from each other, as the ſenſes themſelves. A ſound is no more likely to be miſtaken for bitterneſs than the power of hearing for that of taſting: nor is there any more *ſimplicity* in the ſenſe of ſmelling, or taſting, or hearing, than in that of ſight. But perhaps the Doctor means, that the perceptions conveyed are more various in ſome ſenſes than others. Odours are only perceived by the ſenſe of ſmelling, ſounds only by that of hearing. But the touch ſuppoſe conveys the perception of heat, and cold, roughneſs and ſmoothneſs, hardneſs and ſoftneſs, of ſtraitneſs and curvature, of extenſion and ſolidity, and perhaps of figure, certainly of ſome circumſtances attending it, and it may be of ſwiftneſs or ſlowneſs of motion; and without doubt the moſt various perceptions are thoſe we receive through the ſight. Different objects however affect different ſenſes, and we are equally ignorant of the circumſtances which render the different ſenſes *fitted* to be *affected* by theſe different objects.

Natural philoſophy, ſays the Doctor, page 26, informs us, that all animal and vegetable bodies are continually ſending forth *effluvia* of vaſt *ſubtilety*. Theſe volatile particles, the Doctor *thinks*, do probably repel each other, and ſo ſcatter themſelves in the air; and thus the ſmell of plants and other bodies is cauſed by theſe volatile

parts, &c. We know, by experiment, that air is the vehicle of ſound, but no experiment has yet been made to ſhew that it is the vehicle of odours. And all this fine argument from what the Doctor calls natural philoſophy, ſeems at beſt but a groundleſs conjecture. This ſubtile effluvia, and theſe volatile particles fly about in the air it ſeems, and we *know* they do ſo, becauſe we ſmell: and we ſmell becauſe this ſubtile effluvia, and theſe volatile particles fly about in the air. But the theory, to uſe the Doctor words, that all bodies are ſmelled by means of effluvia, and volatile particles, which are drawn into the noſtrils along with the air, is perhaps like many other theories, rather the product of the imagination, than of juſt induction; for the Doctor acknowledges, page 28, that the ſenſation of ſmelling, of itſelf could never have led us to think of nerves, and animal ſpirits, or effluvia, becauſe the organs of ſmell, do not reſemble the ſenſation of ſmelling, nor does this ſenſation reſemble the objects from which the ſmell, that is, the ſenſation ariſes, page 29.

The Dr. takes great pains to ſhew, at p. 28, &c. that although men are poſſeſſed of the power, or faculty of ſmelling; yet that neither the organ of ſmell, nor the medium (by which *it*, that is, the odour ſmelled, is conveyed to that organ) nor any motions we can conceive in the *pituitary* membrane, or the *olfactory* nerves, or in the animal ſpirits, do in the leaſt *reſemble* the *ſenſation* of ſmelling. How ſubſtances or motions can reſemble ſenſations, I muſt own, I am not able to comprehend: as little can I comprehend the reaſons for, or the benefits of, theſe obſervations which the Dr. thinks neceſſary to premiſe, before he requeſts his reader to attend to what the mind is *conſcious* of, when we ſmell a roſe or a lilly—But what if this conſciouſneſs ſhould prove a fallacy, for, to uſe the Dr. words, p. 12, who is voucher for conſciouſneſs, and who can prove that his conſciouſneſs does

not deceive him? the Dr. goes on "ſince our language affords no particular name for *that* perception in the mind, which ariſes from the ſmell of a *roſe* or a *lilly* (that is, ſince we have not *particular* names for each *particular* ſmell, but include agreeable ſmells under the general name of *odours*, and diſagreeable ſmells, under the general name of *ſtinks*) we call it a ſmell or an odour—to be ſure we do, for we cannot call it by a name which it has not got—well, and what then? why then the perſon who perceives this ſmell cannot perceive any *ſimilitude*, or *agreement*, between the ſmell and the roſe, or indeed between this ſmell, and any other object whatever. And what are we to conclude from this?—Why "that the man cannot determine from the nature of the *thing* (of the ſmell I ſuppoſe) whether *it* (the ſmell namely) is cauſed by body, or ſpirit—by ſomething near, or ſomething at a diſtance. It has no ſimilitude to any thing elſe ſo as to admit of a compariſon, and therefore he can conclude nothing from it, unleſs perhaps that there muſt be ſome unknown cauſe of it. Figure, colour, extenſion, or any other quality of bodies cannot be aſcribed to it." To be ſure they cannot. Nor can theſe qualities be aſcribed to ſound, to the ſenſation of taſte, or to that of the touch, if we in both caſes regard the *ſenſation only*, or in the Dr's. words, p. 28, "if we carefully exclude from theſe names every thing but the *ſenſation itſelf*, nor can the perſon who perceives the ſmell give it a *place*, the Doctor ſays, p. 29, any more than he can give a *place* to melancholy and joy. Now what are we to underſtand by giving a place to a ſmell? Does the Doctor mean by this ſtrange expreſſion that ſmells are incapable of, or inconſiſtent with locality? no general ideas are capable of locality; but particular ideas are, and always muſt be accompanied with the idea of locality. The tuberoſe, which the Doctor ſmelled, p. 30, was in a *certain* room, and the perfume it gave was in

that room. But the Doctor confounds the power of perceiving odours or ſtinks, with the odours and ſtinks themſelves. The *power* of *perception*, whatever be the thing perceived, is, and can only be in the mind that perceives it; or according to the Doctor's expreſſion p. 29, ſenſation can only be in the *ſentient thing:* but a power of exciting ſuch ſenſation, may be in things which are not ſentient. And did not certain powers, regularly and generally accompany certain objects, the whole benefit of experience, by which alone men are fitted to live in this world would be utterly deſtroyed. And what do we learn from theſe abſtract obſervations as the Doctor calls them? p. 30. "Why that ſmelling (that is the power of ſmelling) is a ſimple original affection, or feeling of the mind, altogether inexplicable, and unaccountable, p. 31." And may not the ſame thing be ſaid of all thoſe perceptions, which are introduced into the mind, through the ſenſes, and perhaps of all other perceptions? but ſurely all theſe philoſophical obſervations were not wanted to prove what common ſenſe diſcerns at firſt ſight, viz. that we are utterly ignorant of the manner in which external objects act upon the ſenſes, as well as the manner in which the information received through the ſenſes is conveyed to the mind. And what is the upſhot of all the Doctor's laborious argumentation? why that we cannot aſcertain by *reaſoning*, that knowledge which is *wholly* founded in *experience*. But ſo it is, becauſe the Doctor's countryman, Mr. Hume has written a great deal of what is either utterly confuſed, or utterly unintelligible upon theſe ſubjects, the Doctor kindly endeavours to father all this nonſenſe upon Mr. Locke; with what juſtice all who are capable of underſtanding Mr. Locke muſt be able to ſee. But however much the Doctor may reprobate his country-man, he writes with as little meaning and as much obſcurity himſelf.

If the Doctor ſeems little acquainted with the nature and the operations of our mental faculties, he ſeems equally ignorant of the nature and of the operation of our corporeal ſenſes; and ſo he ſays when I ſmell a roſe, I am neceſſarily determined to *believe* (I certainly know he ſhould have ſaid) that the ſenſation exiſts: that is, when the Doctor ſmells a roſe he is neceſſarily determined to believe that he ſmells it.—Very wonderful this diſcovery! It is, the Doctor ſays, common to all ſenſations that they cannot exiſt without being perceived: that is, that they cannot be perceived, without being perceived; and, if they are perceived, what then? Why then they are perceived: for a ſenſation can only be in the ſentient *thing*. Another diſcovery equally wonderful. And he tells us, Chap. ii. ſect. 3. that a ſenſation, a *ſmell* for inſtance, may be preſented to the mind three different ways.

I. It may be ſmelled.

II. It may be remembered.

III. It may be imagined, or thought of.

Now what are we to underſtand by a ſenſation being *preſented?* But this is by no means the only place in which the Doctor's nonſenſe lurks ſecurely under the covert of an indiſtinct expreſſion, whenever his readers have not ſagacity enough to diſcover the game, nor dexterity enough to beat the buſh ſufficiently to force it out of its hiding place. Had the Doctor been provided with underſtanding to perceive the truth, or honeſty to avow it, he would not have uſed that ambiguous word preſented, but have clearly and fairly ſaid, a ſenſation may be *excited* (for though objects may be preſented to the mind, it can ſcarcely, with propriety, be ſaid that ſenſation can) three ways: but

then his favourite common ſenſe would have told him, that *no* recollection of a *paſt* ſenſation will excite that ſenſation *afreſh*, nor any imagination of it, or any thought about it bring back a *paſt*, and cauſe it to become a *preſent* feeling; for if it could, the effects of the external objects upon the ſenſes, might be rendered perpetual; pain and pleaſure would become capable of endleſs repetition by an *act* of the *will*, and one ſmelling-bottle might ſerve a nation: nor would it be true, as is always obſerved, that the memory of paſt ſufferings is attended with pleaſure, according to that of the Poet;

——— Dulce eſt meminiſſe laborum.

It is difficult, ſays Dr. Reid, p. 26, to unravel the operations of the human underſtanding, and to reduce *them* to their *firſt* principles. Now what are we to underſtand by the *firſt* principles of the *operations* of the human underſtanding? We cannot expect, the Doctor ſays, to ſucceed in the attempt (to unravel the operations of the human underſtanding) but by beginning with the ſimpleſt, and proceeding to the more complex. Now what do theſe words, the ſimpleſt, and more complex refer to? not ſurely to principles, for who ever heard of *complex principles*? Or do theſe words refer to the operations of the human underſtanding? for ſo the Doctor ſhould have worded it, if he had meant to be conſiſtent with what he had juſt before written: but he had a different end in view, viz. that of introducing *imperceived* what he calls his principles of common ſenſe, and ſo he artfully ſubſtitutes the human *faculties* in the place of the human *underſtanding*; well knowing that the word faculties is applicable to the *corporeal*, as well as to the *mental powers*, but that the operations of the human under-

ſtanding relate to the powers of the *mind* ONLY; and ſo, having cunningly made this dextrous ſhift, he goes on with the moſt aſſured confidence to inform his reader, that in an Analyſis of the human *faculties* the five ſenſes may for *this reaſon* (for what reaſon?) *claim* to be *firſt* conſidered; but had he honeſtly put, what his own aſſertions required, that in an Analyſis of the human underſtanding, the five ſenſes claim to be firſt conſidered, who but muſt have ſeen that the *operations* of the human mind, that is, of the intellectual faculties, are as different in their *nature*, as they are in their *purpoſes*, from *thoſe* of the five ſenſes? The external ſenſes are merely avenues, by which one ſpecies of perceptions, viz. thoſe which take their riſe from objects without the mind, are admitted into it.

The precedence in *this* conſideration is to be given, the Doctor tells us, not to the *nobleſt*, or moſt uſeful, but to the *ſimpleſt* ſenſe, which the Doctor deems to be the ſenſe of ſmelling. But why ſmelling is more ſimple than hearing, or taſting, we are not told; yet the effects of theſe ſenſes comprehend only one *ſpecies* of perceptions, viz, odours, or ſounds, or taſtes.

Thoſe who think it worth their while to examine Dr. Reid's book, will find that it abounds with the *like preciſion* of ideas, and reaſoning of a *ſimilar* ſort. Perhaps much of this confuſion would have been prevented, and much uſeleſs argumentation ſaved, had the Doctor not been ſo fearful of defining; for whatever incredible paradoxes he might ſuppoſe to have riſen from this practice, none ſurely can be more incredible than the imagination that the more ignorant we are of the meaning of the words we uſe, the better we ſhould underſtand them. Without any apprehenſions of thoſe dreadful conſequences at which the Doctor is ſo terribly alarmed, I ſhall venture to aſcer-

tain the preciſe ſignification of ſome words which muſt neceſſarily be uſed upon this ſubject.

1. By memory then I mean that faculty of the mind, by which we are enabled to recall our *knowledge* of paſt perceptions, whether attained by conſciouſneſs, or ſenſation: the exertion of this faculty, I call, recollection.

2. By conſciouſneſs I underſtand that faculty of the mind by which we become acquainted with the operations of our various intellectual powers, and the effects of theſe operations; alſo with the exertion of our affections and paſſions, with our deſires, and with thoſe acts of the mind which we call intention, and deſign, and with the acts of the will.

Thus we ſee that memory relates chiefly to that knowledge which we *receive* from *external* objects; conſciouſneſs to that knowledge which *ariſes* from the action of our *own internal* powers. We cannot be conſcious of the mental operations of *other* men, but we may remember their words or their actions, and may be conſcious of this remembrance, as we are conſcious of all other acts of our own minds. Memory can relate *only* to *paſt* knowledge. Conſciouſneſs may relate to the preſent as well as to the paſt actions of our minds. We certainly remember what we have a *paſt* conſciouſneſs of, but the converſe is by no means true, that we are conſcious of whatever we remember, yet this would have been the caſe had conſciouſneſs and memory been, as Dr. Reid aſſerts, the *ſame thing*.

3. By ſenſation I mean that faculty of the mind, by which we became acquainted with the effects of external objects upon our corporeal ſenſes.

4. By perception I underſtand that *information* reſpecting the *internal* acts of the mind, and the external actions of objects upon the ſenſes, which we receive by conſciouſneſs or ſenſation.—And

5. By ideas I understand the effects of these internal acts of our mind, and of external objects transmitted through our corporeal senses. So that ideas are not perceptions, but the consequences of them; and with Dr. Reid's leave I must beg to use this word, till I am furnished with a better reason for laying it aside than any I can find in his book: for unless you admit this species of intuitive knowledge, which we receive from the faculty of consciousness, however inexplicable the nature of it may be (though perhaps not more so than many other of our mental or corporeal faculties,) you deprive men of the character, both of *rational* and *moral* beings; since this consciousness of the internal acts of our intellectual powers, and of our moral dispositions, is the great characteristic distinction, between mankind and the animal world.

It may be proper to observe, that the word perception is sometimes used for *that* power of the mind by which it discerns the various objects presented to it, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Sometimes for the *exertion* of this power, and sometimes for the *effect* produced by this exertion.

The information attained by the use of our perceptive power is either;

I. Acquired.—Or
II. Received.

When this information is derived from the *voluntary* exertion of our intellectual faculties, I say that it is acquired. But when it is forced upon the mind by the involuntary emotions of the affections, and passions, and desires; or by the usual and customary action of external objects upon the senses, I say it is received.

The information acquired by the voluntary exertion of our intellectual powers, is such as we owe to intuition, or demonstration. We cannot remember an intuitive truth, without being conscious of the intuition, whereby we know it to be such; but we may remember that we have been *convinced* by a demonstration without being conscious of the various intuitive steps which led to that conviction. The last is the recollection of a past fact—the other is a present operation of the mind.

The following observations of Mr. Locke, B. I. Chap. ii. Sect. 7. are so strongly verified in the conduct of most serious persons (as they are now *technically* called) in these days, and the practice therein noticed so strongly encouraged by the religious teachers of *all* denominations, that I could not forbear quoting them. "With these persons, doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for *clear* reasons to those, who being *prepossessed*, take not the pains to examine even *what* they themselves say,"—For—"The great difference, Chap. iv. Sect. 22. that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is from the different use they put their faculties to; whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon *trust*, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates, or dominion of others in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, and implicitly to swallow." But though the *generality* can no more be expected to examine for themselves, than they can be expected to calculate an eclipse, yet the teachers of religion, those especially who have had an university education, may surely be expected to be well aware of the heinous crime of misleading others, through their own prejudices, or their own ignorance. Of the students from acadamies I say nothing, for such institutions *generally* profess to teach a great deal too much to afford a reasonable expectation, that persons educated in them, can possibly understand *any one* subject *accurately*.

Obſervation i. upon Book II. Chap. i. Sect. 10.

Our being ſenſible of *it* (i. e. of the exiſtence of ſome certain thing,) is not neceſſary to any thing (not neceſſary to the exiſtence of ſuch thing) but to the exiſtence of our thoughts; i. e. our being ſenſible of our thoughts, is neceſſary to *their* exiſtence—neceſſary to conſtitute them ſuch.

Obſervation ii. upon Book II. Chap. ii. Sect. 1.

It ſeems an inaccurate way of ſpeaking, to ſay that *ideas* are united in the ſame ſubject. Ideas (in the primary ſignification of the word) are merely ſenſations excited in the mind by the operation of external objects upon the corporeal ſenſes, and therefore, ſtrictly ſpeaking, can only be united in (i. e. combined by) the mind. The ſame object may indeed poſſeſs powers of ſuggeſting various ideas. See Obſervation iv. B. II. Chap. xxviii. xxix. xxx. xxxi. See alſo Chap. xxxii. Sect. 14, 16. & Book IV. Chap. iv. Sect. 4.

Obſervation iii. upon B. II. Chap. iv. Sect. 5.

Extenſion of *body*, ſays Mr. L. *is* the coheſion, or continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, moveable parts. The extenſion of body may be *owing* to the coheſion, and continuity of ſolid parts. But are not theſe ſolid parts extended? and what is their extenſion owing to? to the coheſion, and continuity of further ſolid parts? and are we to ſay with the poet,

> So naturaliſts obſerve, a flea
> Hath ſmaller fleas that on him prey;
> And theſe have ſmaller fleas to bite 'em,
> And ſo proceed ad infinitum.

But whatever extenſion of body may be owing to, it cannot be neceſſary that the ſolid parts ſhould be ſeparable, and moveable.

Mr. L. calls the extenſion of *ſpace*, the continuity of *unſolid*, (ſurely not fluid) inſeparable, immoveable parts. What are unſolid, inſeparable, immoveable parts? Space is a general, or an abſtract idea, and therefore *nothing*. Extenſion of ſpace is a *negative* idea, it denotes the *abſence* of body, or matter. See Obſervation x.

Obſervation iv. upon B. II. Chap. viii.

Whenever objects, *however modified*, have a power of exciting the *ſame* ideas, Mr. L. attributes this power to what he calls their *primary qualities*, and he aſſerts, Sect. 15, that the *ideas* of *theſe* primary qualities are *reſemblances*; that is, images of ſuch primary qualities; for that *their* patterns (the patterns, namely, of theſe primary qualities) do really exiſt in the bodies themſelves. But when objects have the power of exciting *ideas*, which ideas have *no* ſuch reſemblance, or image, he attributes *this* power to what he calls their *ſecondary qualities*.

Mr. L. ſeems to have been led into this notion of primary, and ſecondary qualities, by not attending to the *difference* between ideas, and images. Images can only be received by the *ſight*, they neither are, nor can be conveyed to the mind by any other ſenſe, by the touch ſuppoſe, ſee B. II. Chap. ix. Sect. 8. Dr. Reid indeed ſuppoſes that blind perſons may become poſſeſſed of images, as well as thoſe who have the uſe of ſight, though nothing can be plainer, than that they can only be received into the mind by the eye. Becauſe blind perſons can acquire the *idea* of a line, (for who has an image of a mathematical line, i. e. a line which has *no* breadth) and can underſtand the various relations which ariſe from the poſitions of lines, with regard to each

other, and can conceive the ideas of ſolids, generated by the revolution of plane figures about ſome *given line*, appertaining to ſuch figure; the Doctor, therefore, imagines that they may be enabled to form images of external objects, as well as perſons who have the uſe of ſight. He might with equal reaſon have imagined, that becauſe blind perſons can conceive the *mathematical* relations of the rays of light conſidered as lines, and the mathematical generation (if I may ſo call it) of the rain-bow, that therefore they can acquire the idea of colours. Upon what ſort of ground the Doctor builds all this notion, may be ſeen by that imagination of the blind man, who fancied that ſcarlet reſembled the ſound of a trumpet. But the Doctor goes further, and endeavours to prove, by a regular demonſtration, the truth of his aſſertion. The blind man is to conceive lines drawn from the center of a ſphere, through all the various points of an object of *touch* placed within the ſphere, and near to its internal ſurface; and then lines are to be drawn from the center of the ſphere, through all the various *(delineatory)* points of this object of touch, to the internal ſurface of the ſphere, and the points where theſe radii *terminate* are to be *joined*; and as theſe lines *ſo* joined, will become *circles* of the *ſphere* the Doctor ſuppoſes a complete projection of the object, i. e. a *true* image of it will be formed upon the internal ſurface of the ſphere; but ſince a blind perſon can conceive the circles of the ſphere, and ſince theſe delineatory lines, are all circles of the ſphere, therefore it is plain, the Doctor ſays, that this blind perſon will alſo conceive the viſible image of the object *ſo* drawn upon it.

The Doctor is not aware that light and ſhade (of which a blind man cannot poſſibly have any conception) i. e. light in the different degrees of it, form a principal part of thoſe images which ariſe from the ſight; and

that unleſs the *delineatory* lines are projected upon a plane at right-angles to the *principal* viſual ray, the image will vary, more or leſs, from the real appearance, as may be fully ſeen by the length of the ſhadows of objects, made upon the ground by the ſetting ſun; for in this caſe the ſolar rays reſemble the viſual ray, and the ground the plane of projection. But the Doctor's ideas upon the ſubject, are as muddy as they are upon other ſubjects, or he would have known that an image made according to the rules of perſpective upon a curve ſurface, muſt preſent a diſtorted picture to the eye, as the common optical cylinders ſufficiently ſhew. The ſubject is of little importance, but the Doctor has exhibited an enormous parade of mathematics, only to oppoſe what he took to be the opinion of Mr. Locke, with how much judgment, and to how much purpoſe, the reader of it muſt determine. But to return to our more immediate ſubject. Mr. L. was not aware that as ſoon as you ſeparate the parts of the image, i. e. the different ideas of which the image is made up, the colour, ſhape, ſize of a bird ſuppoſe, you utterly deſtroy the reſemblance, that is, the image in the mind, ſuggeſted by the *particular* object, from which ſuch image was received: for images are the reſemblances of *particular* objects. There is no ſuch thing as making, or conceiving an image, which ſhall reſemble *all* birds, of every ſize, ſhape, and colour, any more than you can form a reſemblance of ſolidity, extenſion, mobility, diviſibility, &c. And you may juſt as well ſay, that the colour, ſhape, ſize, &c. exiſt in the object when you do not ſee them, as that the ſolidity, extenſion, &c. exiſt in the object, when you do not perceive them. To affirm this, is only to ſay, that *ſuch* objects have the power of exciting ſuch ideas, whenever theſe objects occur to the ſenſes; and all objects have, and muſt have, this power of exciting ideas, or they would not be objects at all.

The *idea* of ſolidity, extenſion, &c. taken without reference to body, or matter *actually* exiſting, is nothing but an idea, and is no more in the body from whence it is received, than the idea of pain, or ſickneſs, (ſee Sect. 18.) is in the manna. To aſk, as Dr. Reid does, "whether theſe perceptions are any *thing*, is to aſk whether they are not *ſomething elſe*, and *not* perceptions? To aſk whether they are *real*, is to aſk whether in the *ſame* circumſtances, they occur to *all* mankind? To ſuppoſe it neceſſary, as the Doctor does, that there ſhould be a *ſimilitude*, between every perception, and the circumſtance from which ſuch perception ariſes, is to make a ſuppoſition, for which there is no general foundation: and in every caſe, but that of perceptions received by the ſight, i. e. of images, the ſuppoſition is manifeſtly impoſſible. Matter has a power of exciting the ideas of ſolidity, and extenſion, and manna has a power of exciting the ideas of ſickneſs, and pain. The former of theſe ideas can be admitted into the mind by the *touch* of the *hands*, the latter only by the *touch* of the *ſtomach*; but ideas are ſtill ideas, by whatever way they are admitted, and *as* ideas, they are only *in* the *mind*, they neither are nor can be in the objects which excite them." (B. II. Chap. xxiii. Sect. 10.) The ideas themſelves, and the power of exciting theſe ideas, are very different matters. It ſeems indeed juſt as poſſible to explain the mode by which ſenſation is produced in us, or the way by which external objects excite ideas in our minds, as it is to explain the nature of ſleep, or of dreaming, the operation of recollection, or the beginning of motion in the body, in conſequence of the action of the will.

Obſervation v. upon Book II. Chap. viii. Sect. 9.

What Mr. L. calls *qualities* in objects, is only the

exiſtence of powers in theſe objects to excite certain ideas, B. II. Chap. xxiii. Sect. 10, in our minds. But what are thoſe qualities which are ſo inſeparable from the body in which they exiſt, as not to admit of any *poſſible* change? The power of exciting certain ideas we ſay, is in the object,—but there are powers in other objects, which can totally deſtroy theſe *original* powers, and introduce new ones in their ſtead. Thus the action of fire, or of aqua regia, can give to gold a power of exciting another idea which it did not poſſeſs in its original form, viz. the idea of fluidity; and it takes away the power it before had of exciting the idea of ſolidity. So the action of the ſun takes from bees-wax, the power it had of exciting the idea of yellowneſs, and gives it a power it had not before, of exciting the idea of whiteneſs, and ſo on. We know of no matter whatever which is not liable to ſuch changes. Divide a piece of wood, Mr. Locke would ſay, yet ſtill each part has ſolidity, and extenſion; ſolidity, and extenſion are *therefore primary qualities*.—Put it into the fire, ſay I, and then what becomes of *theſe* primary qualities? will it ſtill retain them? Yet this is his grand criterion of ſuch qualities. Mr. L. is not aware, that when he talks of qualities that are utterly *inſeparable* from the body, in *what eſtate ſoever* it be, ſuch qualities, as in *all* the *alterations* and *changes* it ſuffers, and under *all* the *force* that can be uſed upon it, it conſtantly keeps; and when he inſtances in what he would *call* the *qualities* of extenſion, and ſolidity, and figure, &c. he is only reciting the *general* ideas which enter into his abſtract idea of matter, or ſubſtance, and which of courſe will always be found with the reſpective *particular* ideas, from which ſuch *general* ideas are taken, but never can be found without them; in the like way Mr. Dugald Stewart tells us, page 3, of his Philoſophy of the Human Mind, 8vo. 1802, "that the ideas annexed to the words matter, and

mind, (as he ſays is well obſerved by Dr. Reid, in his Eſſays on the active powers of Man, p. 8 & 9,) are merely *relative.*" (I am not ſure that I underſtand what he means by this word,) " if I am aſked," he goes on, " what I mean by *matter*, I can only explain myſelf by ſaying it is *that* which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or ſoft, rough or ſmooth, hot or cold—that is, I can *define* it no other way, than by enumerating its *ſenſible qualities.* It is not *matter* or *body*, which I perceive by my *ſenſes.* To be ſure not. Matter or body is a general idea, the mere creature of the mind, and created merely for the conveniency of *verbal* communication. When Mr. Stewart looks at his poultry—it is not *bird* which he perceives by his ſenſes, but cocks, hens, chickens, ducks, geeſe, and turkeys: ideas taken from actual exiſtence, can only be excited by particular objects, but when we want to diſcourſe about a great number of particular objects, which ſuggeſt ſome ideas that are the *ſame*, and alſo ſome ideas that are *different*, a *general* term comprehending them *all*, but *exactly* agreeing to *no* one in particular, muſt ſave the trouble of *refering* to each particular idea. Juſt ſo the chymiſts obſerve, that phlogiſton is never to be met with *pure*,—and how ſhould it? for it is the *general* idea of *inflammability:* but this idea cannot be an object of Senſe—like all other general ideas, it is collected from obſerving many different kinds of ſubſtances which *will* burn, as well as many, which will *not*; and it is this difference, which gives riſe to the general term in this caſe, as it does in all others, for if *all* ſubſtances would burn, we ſhould have no occaſion for *this* term; there would have been no opportunity to diſtinguiſh between ſuch matters as would burn, and ſuch as would not. General ideas are *ſimple* ideas, they cannot be defined, we can only refer to the manner in which they are *acquired*, in

order to communicate our knowledge of them to other perſons, they neither are, nor can be objects of ſenſe. Objects of ſenſe muſt be *particular* from the very nature of them.

Obſervation vi. upon Book II. Chap. ix. Sect. 3.

Whatever impreſſions are made on the *outward* parts (ſenſes) if they are not taken notice of *within*, ſays Mr. Locke, there is no perception; which is only ſaying, if there is no perception—there is no perception. Mr. Locke meant to have ſaid, that a certain degree of *attention* was neceſſary, to render the action of external objects perceptible; and by attention, I mean the application of our various powers to their *appropriate* objects. But ſuch is the nature of the human frame, that we cannot attend *equally* to two, or more objects at the *ſame* time. All perſons can hear articulate ſounds, which are *familiar* to them, and which they *expect*, with much greater facility, than thoſe to which they are intire ſtrangers.

Obſervation vii. upon B. II. Chap. xii. Sect. 4.

"I call ſuch ideas," ſays Mr. Locke, "complex ideas, which however compounded contain not in them the ſuppoſition of *ſubſiſting* by themſelves,—but are conſidered as dependencies on, or affections of ſubſtances." Now what are we to underſtand by ideas *ſubſiſting* by themſelves? and what by their being *dependencies* on, or *affections* of ſubſtances? All ideas, except thoſe formed by the mind within itſelf, are ſuggeſted, or excited, by *external* objects. Are we then to conſider general, or abſtract ideas as *ſubſiſting* by themſelves? and *images* of external objects, or ideas ſuggeſted by, or ariſing from, animate, or inanimate matter, as *dependencies* on, or *af-*

fections of ſubſtances? Mr. Locke conſiders the ideas ſignified by the words, triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. as dependencies on, or affections of ſubſtances. But theſe ideas are all general, or abſtract ideas. They are the creation of the mind, and if they can be ſaid to depend upon *any* thing, it muſt be upon the will of him who forms them, and who chuſes *what* ideas he will combine together, and expreſs, by theſe *names*. The idea of a triangle does not imply that ſuch triangle is iſoſceles, or equilateral; ſcalene, or right angled; acute, or obtuſe angled; though Mr. Locke calls this idea, B. III. Chap. iii. Sect. 9, a *thing*. The *image* indeed of a triangle does determine the *kind*, but then images are *particular* ideas, that is, they are the image of ſome *particular* thing, B. IV. Chap. vii. Sect. 9.

Obſervation viii. upon Book II. Chap. xii. Sect. 6.

"The ideas of ſubſtances," ſays Mr. Locke, "are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas as are taken to *repreſent* particular things, that is, particular ſubſtances." The ideas of ſubſtances are *collections* of all thoſe various ſimple ideas, which ſuch ſubſtances have a power of exciting: but what ſort of a repreſentation is the repreſentation of ſolidity, mobility, diviſibility, &c.? But ſays Mr. Locke, "along with theſe combinations of ſimple ideas, the *ſuppoſed*, or *confuſed* idea of ſubſtance, *ſuch as it is*, is always the firſt, or chief."—Here again, ſubſtance is a *general*, or *abſtract* idea, and like all other general or abſtract ideas, is no more confuſed, than any other general, or abſtract idea, of ſolidity, or mobility ſuppoſe. General or abſtract ideas do not admit of *any image* in the mind, however they are made, and you have juſt as clear an idea of ſubſtance as you have of animal, or creature, or human nature, &c.

Obſervation ix. upon B. II. Chap. xii. Sect. 13.

"The parts of *pure* ſpace," ſays Mr. Locke, "are *inſeparable*, *one* from the *other*; and again, Sect. 14, the parts of *pure* ſpace are immoveable."—The *parts* of an *abſtract* idea! He muſt be cunning who can *divide* an abſtract idea, or who can conceive the *motion* of it.

Ideas are the *materials* of all our knowledge. They are either,

I. Suggeſted to the mind by the various external objects, with which we are every where ſurrounded.—Or

II. They are formed by the mind within itſelf.

The *firſt* ſort of ideas are conveyed to the mind through the ſenſes, by the action of theſe various powers of the human body. The *ſecond* are formed by the mind itſelf, in conſequence of the action of the various powers of the human underſtanding; by which we are enabled at *will* to *compare*, *combine*, *ſeparate*, and *recall* our ideas; and in conſequence to *form* abſtract, or general ideas in the mind, for the convenience of language; images in the imagination for pleaſure; and alſo to combine a variety of *images*, and *ideas* by the faculty of invention, for the various purpoſes of life. Hence alſo we further obtain occaſion for exerciſing thoſe other operations of the mind, *attention*, *conſideration*, and *judgment*.

The ideas conveyed to the mind *through* the *ſenſes* are always of a *definite* kind, they are the ideas of *particular* objects, for they are excited by particular objects. Whenever ideas are excited by *ſuch* objects, as are not wholly within the reach of our ſenſes, whether from the magnitude of the object, the imperfection of our ſenſes, or from any other cauſe, theſe objects can be only *imperfectly* comprehended: the parts out of the reach of our

ſenſes are juſt the ſame, with reſpect to us, as *no* parts: in ſuch circumſtances, we have, and can only have, a *partial*, that is, an *imperfect* idea; and when the parts out of the reach of our ſenſes, are utterly *undiſcoverable*, as in the caſe of infinity, to whatever this term is applied, the idea we have cannot be particular, i. e. *defined*—it muſt be general. But it is impoſſible that objects ſhould excite *general* ideas. Theſe *general* ideas are, and can only be creatures of the mind, and therefore cannot be *marks*, like *particular* ideas of *real exiſtence*.

The external objects, ſuggeſting ideas to our minds, differ greatly from each other; and ideas ſuggeſted by them, are admitted into the mind, by ſenſes no leſs different, according to the nature of the reſpective objects ſuggeſting, and the nature of the ideas ſuggeſted by them. Theſe ideas ſometimes ariſe from a *ſingle* perception, as is the caſe of ſmells, ſounds, colours, &c. ſometimes they ariſe from a *number* of different perceptions, as in the caſe of many images, preſented through the eye, and of various ſubſtances, and kinds of matter from which we receive ideas by the touch. Some ideas do *not* ſuggeſt the notion of parts, as colours, ſounds, ſmells, and taſtes: ſome ſuggeſt the *notion* of *diſſimilar* parts, as thoſe of ſubſtances, whether animate, or inanimate; and ſome ſuggeſt the notion of *ſimilar* parts, as the ideas of number, extenſion, and perhaps that of duration. When complex ideas are made up by the repeated addition of the *ſame ſimple idea*, as all ideas of number, are made up of units, thoſe of linear extenſion of *particular* lines, &c. theſe ſimple ideas become *meaſures* of the collective ideas, and by means of ſuch meaſures, the various quantities of number, and extenſion can be compared with each other reſpectively; and thus the relative proportion of each can be aſcertained: for by comparing *magnitudes* with each other,

by means of ſome common meaſure, we acquire the idea of that *relation* which we call proportion: and as there neither *is*, nor can be any limits to *ideal* addition, or diviſion, this ideal addition, or diviſion, is ſaid to be *infinite*. A word which does not imply any *poſitive* idea, B. II. Chap. xvii. Sect. 18, but only a *negation* of limits, to the perpetual repetition of *ſuch* addition, or diviſion. The ſame is true of the immenſity of ſpace, the infinity of number, the eternity of duration—they are mere negative ideas: but when ſpace, number, or duration by being *defined* in *quantity*, become *particular*, and *therefore poſitive* ideas, they acquire the names of time, place and quantity. Yet Mr. Locke applies the *negative*, and *therefore* unattainable idea of infinity, B. II. Chap. xxiii. Sect. 34, & 35, to attain a preciſe, i. e. a poſitive idea of God. When we ſay that the power, wiſdom, goodneſs, and knowledge, &c. of God are infinite, we mean to ſay, that we know *not how far they* extend. When immenſity, eternity, ſpirituality, &c. are applied to God, theſe words are not intended to convey any poſitive idea *what* God *is*, but what he is *not*. The ideas of the immenſity of ſpace, the infinity of number, the eternity of duration, are not ſuggeſted to our minds by *any* objects *actually* exiſting, B. II. Chap. xvii. Sect. 4, & 5; they are *formed* by the mind: but the mind cannot *form*, it can only *receive* the ideas of the objects which *actually exiſt*, B. II. Chap. ii. Sect. 2. The ideas which the mind *forms*, neither are, nor can be ideas of things which actually exiſt, they are, and only can be general, i. e. abſtract ideas. To ſay, as is ſometimes ſaid, that God is extended through the *whole* of infinite ſpace, when the idea of *whole* cannot poſſibly be applied to infinity: to talk of the whole, of what, from its very nature, neither has, nor can have a *whole*, is to talk unintelligibly, is to uſe words which have no meaning. When we ſpeak of the omnipreſence, or

ubiquity of God, we mean only, that he knows perfectly the ſtate of, and changes in his own works, however diſtant from each other, at all times, that nothing is unknown to him.

Obſervation x. upon Book II. Chap. xiv. Sect. 2.

Mr. Locke ſuppoſes the idea of duration may be acquired by obſerving the ſucceſſion of ideas in our own minds. Perhaps it might be acquired more readily, by obſerving the motion of two bodies (of which the ſwifteſt precedes) paſſing along the *ſame* line, with unequal velocity. Our ideas of the parts of duration are always referred to thoſe meaſures which the mind arbitarily applies to it; for it ſeems not to have any natural meaſure like extenſion, and number. Its parts cannot be *compared* with each other, like thoſe of linear extenſion, number, or ſome forms of ſpace, by juxta poſition.

Obſervation xi. upon Book II. Chap. 21.

Deſire I apprehend is a *ſtate* of mind conſequent upon the perception of ſome good, *without* any conſideration whether ſuch good is attainable, or not. This conſideration may precede, or follow, but makes *no* part of *ſuch* ſtate. Intention I ſuppoſe is a determination of the mind, reſpecting *future* action, as volition reſpects *preſent* action. I call *will* the *power* of *choice*. *This* power as *exiſting* in the mind, implies from the very nature of it, the moſt perfect freedom from *all* reſtraint. I ſay as exiſting in the mind: becauſe the effects, (not the *action*) of this power may be hindered by external cauſes. The thief in jail may *chooſe* to be at large, and no power on earth can hinder his *choice*, though it may prevent the *execution* of that choice. The man's will is no leſs free, although his body may be bound in chains,

and his limbs in links of iron; any more than he loſes the *power* of *ſight*, though he chooſes to ſhut his eyes, or is confined in a dark cell, where he can ſee nothing: the effect of that power is indeed hindered pro tempore, by theſe external reſtraints. When God, by a voice from heaven, prevented Abraham from ſlaying his ſon, the action was as effectually hindered, as if the patriarch had *choſen* to diſobey the divine command, given to ſacrifice Iſaac, or God had ſtruck him with a dead palſy when he ſtretched forth *his hand to compleat* the ſacrifice. It would have been equally compleat, though not to human eyes, if by a band of robbers, Iſaac had been carried away during the journey, *to the place of ſacrifice*. And God, who ſeeth not as man ſeeth, might with equal truth have pronounced the obedience of Abraham perfect in the ſame words, "for becauſe thou *haſt done* this thing, and haſt *not* withheld thy ſon—thine only ſon, &c." Nobody, however, calls *external* hindrances, *neceſſity*. That reſtraint alone is neceſſity, which takes away the *power*, not that which only prevents the wiſhed for effect of choice.

Obſervation xii. upon Book II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 13.

Agents that have *no* thought—*no* volition—*no* power of choice—are—*no agents*. Such beings are *paſſive*, not active beings. Thoſe motions of the parts of the body, which the will can neither excite, nor prevent, are, ſo long as this inability continues, neceſſary motions; i. e. they are ſuch for which the perſon is not reſponſible. It is the power of choice which makes agents reſponſible for their actions.

Obſervation xiii. upon B. II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 15, & 16.

Mr. Locke confounds the *freedom* of choice, with

the *power* of *acting* in conſequence of that choice. If you define *will* to be the power of choice, and *liberty* the power of acting in conſequence of that choice, you make two diſtinct powers; volition belongs to one, and ability of action to the other.

Obſervation xiv. upon Book II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 17.

It is ſurely a ſtrange thing to call the acts of chooſing and perceiving, *modes* of *thinking*. Choice may depend upon *thought*; i. e. upon reflecting and conſidering: and ſight may depend upon choice. But ſeeing is no more chooſing, than thinking is chooſing, and choice is no more thinking than it is ſeeing, or recollecting. Thinking, and choice are two different operations of the mind, and as diſtinct from each other, as invention and memory. The *will* certainly directs the operations of the underſtanding, juſt as much as it does the actions of the body; were it not ſo, a man might employ his judgment, when he ſhould employ his imagination, and his legs, when he ſhould uſe his hands.

Obſervation xv. upon B. II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.

The human mind is poſſeſſed, or conſiſts of a great variety of *powers*, no leſs *different* in their nature, than *diſtinct* in the mode of their operations; and by conſidering the nature, and operations of each, we attain exact notions of the different ſorts of knowledge, which the mind is capable of acquiring; and alſo of the manner, by which *each* ſort is acquired: and there is no more impropriety in affirming, that the powers of perception, attention, conſideration, judgment, imagination, invention, memory, &c. are ſeparate, and diſtinct

faculties, than that ſight, hearing, ſmelling, taſting, feeling, are ſeparate, and diſtinct ſenſes of the body. Nor is it more abſurd to ſay, that diſcernment depends upon the power of perception, than that volition depends upon the power of choice. And to ſay that the will is *not* free, becauſe a man muſt receive, or reject what is thus propoſed to his choice, is juſt as wiſe as to ſay, that a man is not free to ſee *no* objects at all, when his eyes are open, nor free to ſee any, when they are ſhut.

Obſervation xvi. upon B. II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 28, & 29.

When Mr. Locke attempts to define volition, which, like moſt acts of the mind, is a *ſimple* idea (ſee Sect. 30,) he is forced to define motion to be (if neceſſity requires) *no* motion at all—i. e. freedom from motion, that is *reſt*. He goes on to inquire, what determines the will? Had he attended, I do not ſay to the *nature*, but to the *deſign* of our various faculties, he would have ſeen that the inquiry was not leſs uſeleſs, than abſurd. Indeed he ſeems to confound the power of choice, which God has given men (juſt as he has given them the powers of perception, and ſight, &c.) with the *particular* reaſons for exerciſing, i. e. for uſing theſe various powers. He alſo confounds the power of choice, which he calls preference, with the power of acting in conſequence of this choice, as was before obſerved. He conſiders liberty, Sect. 8, & 24, or freedom, Sect. 27, not as the power of choice, but as the power of acting in conſequence of this power of choice. But there is a manifeſt difference. The power of choice, from the very *nature* of it, admits of *no* reſtraint in *any caſe*. Men have no longer the power of choice, if this power *can* be *reſtrained*: but the power of *acting*, may depend upon external circumſtances in particular caſes. See Obſervation xi, & xiii.

Obſervation xvii. upon B. II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 30.

Mr. Locke cautions his readers not to confound deſire, and volition. They are as diſtinct, as deſire, and intention. Attentive perſons will ſee that deſire may reſpect *general* objects, choice (which is the action of the will) can only regard particulars.

Obſervation xviii. upon Book II. Chap. xxi. Sect. 31.

The *moſt* preſſing uneaſineſs, ſays Mr. Locke, determines the will; i. e. he *calls that* uneaſineſs the *moſt* preſſing which *does* determine the will. All this is juſt like the final perſeverance of the ſaints.—All *who* perſevere are *ſaints*—And all *who* are *ſaints* perſevere—2d. edit.

Obſervation xix. upon B. II. Chap. xxiii. Sect. 15.

It is curious to ſee how a man of Mr. Locke's diſcernment, and warineſs, can put the change (to uſe a galliciſm) upon himſelf. "Putting together, ſays he, the ideas of thinking, and willing, or the power of moving, or quieting motion, joined to ſubſtance, of which we have no diſtinct or poſitive idea"—i. e. no idea at all.—Now had this aſſertion been honeſtly worded, it would have run thus—putting together the ideas of thinking, and willing, or the idea to excite, or to quiet motion, to the idea of ſubſtance, of which we have *no idea at all*, we acquire, &c. A very curious mixture this of ideas, and no ideas!

Obſervation xx. upon Book II. Chap. xxiii. Sect. 18.

It is not true, that the ideas belonging to ſpirit, are *thinking*, and *will*; or a power of putting *body* (i. e. matter in general) into motion *by* thought. According

to all our experience, ſpirit muſt be connected with body in a very peculiar manner, before it can produce motion *by* thought. Men can only move the parts of their *own* bodies *by* thought: to move *other* bodies, ſome what *more* than thought is neceſſary.

Obſervation xxi. upon B. II. Chap. xxiii. Sect. 30.

"The idea *we have* of ſpirit," ſays Mr. Locke—we have—we can have *no idea* of ſpirit—no *poſitive* idea. All we mean, all we *can* mean by this word, is only a negation of ſuch ſort of matter as we are acquainted with: and negative ideas cannot produce actual, i. e. *poſitive* knowledge. But, ſays Mr. Locke, "the ſubſtance of ſpirit is unknown to us—ſo is the ſubſtance of body equally unknown to us."—Very true to be ſure. But matter ſuggeſts to us various ideas, through the ſenſes, and it is by the ſenſes *alone*, that we acquire the idea of real exiſtence. A *power* of thinking, or acting is *no* object of our ſenſes; and though theſe powers are not found in any ſuch ſort of matter, as is the object of our ſenſes, yet the *abſence* of *theſe* powers from all *ſuch* matter, as *we* are *acquainted* with, by no means ſhews the *nature* of *that* matter in which *theſe* powers are found. The word *immateriality* means only a negation of all ſuch ideas, as are excited in our minds by ſubſtance. See B. IV. Chap. x. Sect. 13, 14, 15. & Chap. xi. Sect. 12.

Mr. Locke calls believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping, ſeveral *modes* of *thinking*. He might juſt as well have called expecting, admiring, loving, hating, modes of thinking.—It puts one in mind of the honeſt ſea-lieutenant—"if any man contradicts me, I knock him down, that's *my way* of thinking."

Obſervation xxii. upon B. II. Chap. xxiv.

What Mr. Locke calls collective ideas, are only *ſuch* ideas to which number is applicable.

Obſervation xxiii. upon B. II. Chap. xxviii.

Mr. Locke writes a long, unintelligible chapter upon perſonal identity, to inquire in what identity conſiſts. It is unqueſtionably a perception of the mind, and you might juſt as well inquire, in *what* equality, or proportion, or the moral perception of right and wrong, conſiſts. Or, are you inclined to aſk, from *whence* this perception ariſes? You may juſt as well aſk from *whence* all thoſe perceptions ariſe, which we call conſciouſneſs? Indeed the whole moral government of God is, and muſt be founded in the identity of his intelligent creatures. To ſuppoſe a reſponſible being may *vary* from itſelf, is juſt as wiſe as to ſuppoſe that beings may contract guilt *before* they come into exiſtence; or may commit crimes, *before* they are born. Yet however impoſſible, or abſurd theſe laſt notions may be, we know that many perſons, of the *reality* of whoſe piety no doubt can be entertained, have zealouſly maintained them. It is amongſt ſuch perſons, that we hear of ſinners by *nature*, and ſinners by *practice*; a diſtinction not to be met with in ſcripture: and had theſe good perſons conſidered, what is, and only can be meant by the word *nature*, viz. that combination of powers, diſpoſitions, qualifications, and qualities which GOD has *allotted* to the various beings and matters which he has created, they would have ſeen the folly of this diſtinction. For, according to the information of that underſtanding which our Creator has given us, he can no more *make* or appoint men to be ſinners, independent of their own choice, than he can make the united ideas

of two and three, to compoſe the idea of ſix; or than he can make a circle to have the properties of a triangle. According to all thoſe ideas of juſtice which he has enabled us to collect, there cannot be *guilt* without *intention* and *deſign*, i. e. without the exerciſe of the *will*: where there is no guilt there can be no tranſgreſſion, and conſequently *no* puniſhment, in the *proper* ſenſe of the word, for by puniſhment is meant evil inflicted, for evil done. All that this abſurd diſtinction does, if we have any ideas to our words, is to make God the author of ſin. But had men liſtened to that reaſon which God has given them, we ſhould never have heard of ſuch notions, or ſuch inquiries.

It is curious to ſee what ſort of reaſoning, even able men are given to employ, when they muſt needs inquire into what cannot be underſtood. At Sect. 9, Mr. Locke defines perſon to mean a *thinking*, *intelligent* being, that has reaſon and reflection; (are there then any thinking, intelligent beings, which have not reaſon and reflection?) and can conſider itſelf, as the *ſame* thinking *thing*, in different times and places. At Sect 11, he ſays, "thus we ſee the *ſubſtance* whereof perſonal-ſelf, (i. e. perſon) conſiſted at one time, may be *varied* at another, *without* the change of perſonal identity; there being no queſtion about the ſame perſon," (i. e. the ſameneſs of perſon) though the limbs, which but now were *part of it*, were cut off.—In theſe two paſſages, the word perſon is uſed for two *very different* ideas.

But this perſonal identity conſiſts in a being, which is able to conſider itſelf as the *ſame* thinking *thing*, in different times and places—that is—perſonal identity conſiſts in being *able* to perceive it, or in other words, perſonal identity conſiſts in—perſonal identity. Waving then all debate about the eſſence of perſonal identity, a doubt concerning which the ableſt phyſicians have long held to be the *ſureſt* mark of lunacy; and of which ex-

ſence we ſhall be hard ſet to find a better criterion than that of the Poet—

> If I be I, as I think I be,
> I have a Liſle dog that will know me:
> For if I be I, he will wag his tail,
> But if I b'ent I, he will bark and rail.

Obſervation xxiv. upon B. II. Chap.xxix . Sect. 4.

In enumerating the occaſions of indiſtinct ideas, Mr. Locke omits one common cauſe, viz. the attempting to convey *ſimple* ideas by *language*, whether it be by literal, or metaphorical deſcription.

Obſervation xxv. upon B. II. Chap. xxix. Sect. 13.

Complex ideas, ſays Mr. Locke, being made up of a number, or collection of ſimple ideas may be diſtinct in *one* part, and confuſed in *another*. He inſtances, in the idea of a ſolid (and he might have inſtanced, in that of a plain figure) of a thouſand ſides. The *idea*, ſays he, of the *number* is *diſtinct*, that of the *figure* is confuſed. He here confounds ideas and images. The image of a figure of three or four ſides, is as diſtinct as the ideas of the number three, or the number four: it is the multitude of the ſides that render the *idea* of the image indiſtinct. While numbers continue to be unapplied to any particular ſubjects, the ideas excited by the *names* of ſuch numbers, are only general ideas. The words two—three—three dozen—three ſcore—three hundred, convey no ideas, till joined to ſome ſubject capable of number. They are indeed *preciſe* names, and admit of *no* degrees, like many other ſimple ideas; and when applied can be *diſtinctly* aſcertained. The mind can clearly conceive a ſmall number of objects to which number can be applied, but the diſtinctneſs of

this idea is loſt in a multitude; and, therefore, what Mr. Locke calls collective ideas, are a ſort of general ideas —ideas, to be *preciſe*, muſt be particular ideas.

Obſervation xxvi. upon B. II. Chap. xxx.

Our ideas are of two ſorts—They are either,

I. Such as are introduced into the mind through the ſenſes, being the effects of powers implanted in the various works of God, and ordained by him to raiſe theſe ſenſations in us—Or they are,

II. Modifications of theſe *original* ideas, and are the productions of our own minds, in conſequence of the voluntary exerciſe of our various intellectual powers, and therefore may, perhaps, be more properly called *primary* and *ſecondary*, or *native*, and *factitious* ideas, (primary, or native, as ſuggeſted, or excited, by the works of nature, i. e. of God: and ſecondary, or factitious, as not being *originally received*, but being the voluntary productions of our minds,) rather than real and fantaſtical: becauſe *all* our ideas are equally *real*, though not equally marks of real exiſtence. And we conclude certain ideas to be *marks* of *real* exiſtence, ſince when men have the perfect uſe of thoſe ſenſes, through which *theſe* ideas are admitted into the mind, *they* appear to be *alike* in *all* mankind. And we reaſonably conclude that the powers, by which objects excite *theſe* ideas, to be *permanent*, becauſe upon the *uniformity* and *regularity* of cauſes, and effects, not only the comfortable ſubſiſtence, but the very exiſtence of mankind does, in their preſent circumſtances, and unavoidably muſt, depend.

Obſervation xxvii. upon B. II. Chap. xxx. Sect. 2.

"Our ſimple ideas," ſays Mr. Locke, "are all *real*,

and *true*, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe powers of things which produce them." We *believe* theſe ideas, as far as we can judge, are the *effects* of ſuch powers, and we *believe* the exiſtence of ſuch powers, becauſe *theſe* ideas are excited by *theſe* things, in the minds of *all* mankind: and we conclude from the uniformity, and regularity of *this* effect, that *the things* conſtantly, and univerſally exciting ſuch ideas, are *real*, i. e. actually exiſt.

Obſervation xxviii. upon B. II. Chap. xxx. Sect. 4.

Mixed modes and relations, ſays Mr. Locke, have no *other* reality, but what they have in the minds of men, i. e. they are *mere* ideas. As *ſimple* ideas are ſuggeſted to the mind by the works of God, ſo the ideas, called mixed modes, or relations, are ſuggeſted to the mind by the *actions* of men, both through the ſenſes, and by reflection; juſt as the knowledge of the exiſtence of God is ſuggeſted by his works through the ſenſes, or communicated by his word through the underſtanding to mankind.

Theſe ideas, (i. e. mixed modes) ſays Mr. Locke, are *themſelves* archetypes, and therefore cannot differ from *their* archetypes, nor be chimerical, unleſs any one will jumble together inconſiſtent ideas (as Joſeph Milner, and Biſhop Hoadley, have jumbled together the inconſiſtent ideas of pardon and acquittal, ſee Hoadley's Terms of Acceptance, and the Diſſertation prefixed to Four Eſſays, by T. Ludlam.) But Chap. xxxi. Sect. 3, Mr. Locke ſays, our complex ideas of modes, are voluntary collections of ſimple ideas, which the mind puts together, *without* any reference to *real* archetypes, or *ſtanding* patterns; (a few lines lower he ſays, mixed modes, and relations *are* archetypes *without* patterns)

becauſe not being intended for copies of *things really* exiſting, but for archetypes *made* by the mind. Is it proper to talk of archetypes *made* by the mind? If an archetype means any thing, it means a pattern, or ſimilitude, to which recourſe may be had by *all* men; and can ſuch recourſe be had to archetypes formed in, or by the mind, for the purpoſe of comparing it with what is ſuppoſed to be ſimilar? Complex ideas can only be communicated by definitions, i e. by enumerations of *all* the ſimple ideas they contain, which are combined under one name, Book III. Chap. xii. Sect. 15, 16.

Obſervation xxix. upon Book II. Chap. xxx. Sect. 7.

If the eſſence of things is intelligible, it can only be known from an enumeration of that *whole* collection of powers to excite certain ideas, which are uſually found combined together in ſuch things; each of *theſe* powers are called *qualities*, or *properties*; but properties mean only a *partial* conſideration of *ſuch* things. *Nominal* eſſences are therefore nothing, B. III. Chap. iii. Sect. 15. Chap. iv. Sect. 3. Chap. viii. Sect. 1. Chap. ix. Sect. 17. Mr. Locke ſays, B. III. Chap. v. Sect. 2, that abſtract ideas are the *eſſences* of mixed modes. Abſtract ideas are *nothing*, i. e. they have, they can have no connection with real exiſtence, but are only general names. Mixed modes, ſays Mr. Locke, are only made by the mind—they are made *arbitrarily*, i. e. without patterns. See Obſervation xxix. It is not true, as Mr. Locke ſays, that mixed modes are made *without any* reference to *real* exiſtence. They are made from obſerving the actions of, and the relations interceding between men and each other, and between themſelves and their own actions.

Obſervation xxx. upon B. II. Chap. xxxi. Sect. 1.

When Mr. Locke ſays ſuch ideas are inadequate, which are partial, or imperfect *repreſentations* of the archetypes to which they are referred, he muſt be underſtood to ſpeak of *images*.

Obſervation i. upon Book III. Chap. vi. Sect. 28.

"It is neceſſary," ſays Mr. Locke, "to the making any nominal eſſence, i. e. any *ſpecific* idea, that the ideas, whereof it conſiſts, have *ſuch* an *union* as to make but *one* idea how compounded ſoever. *Such union* may, to be ſure, have *one name*; but how it can become *one idea* I am not able to underſtand. Mr. Locke means, I ſuppoſe, that the ſpecific idea of ſubſtances, muſt be made up of *all* thoſe ideas which are ſuggeſted by ſuch ſubſtances reſpectively. The ſpecific ideas of mixed modes, ſo far as they are arbitrary, cannot be *falſe*; but when we are to aſcertain the ideas annexed to words, which are uſed in *writers*, to *whom* we cannot have recourſe for any deſired explanation, we can only collect theſe ideas from *their* uſe of words, conveying theſe ideas in different parts of their writings. The ſpecific ideas of ſubſtances are in *no* caſe arbitrary; they muſt not contain any ideas which are not ſuggeſted by ſuch ſubſtances, he who ſhould put malleability into his idea of glaſs, or fixity in the fire, into his idea of ſteel, would give a *falſe* idea of theſe ſubſtances.

For an illuſtration of Book III. Chap. ix. Sect. 9. See the following

ESSAY UPON THE COMMUNICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

The various faculties of the human frame plainly ſhew, that man was intended by his Creator to acquire

a variety of knowledge; and the organs of ſpeech vouchſafed unto him, as plainly ſhew, that it was alſo intended, that he ſhould communicate this knowledge to his fellow-creatures. Becauſe, to what purpoſe was he thus qualified to make an endleſs *variety* of articulate, i. e. diſtinct ſounds, (a power *not* vouchſafed to any other creature) and alſo to repeat with exactneſs theſe ſpecific ſounds, as often as he chooſes; unleſs theſe ſounds were intended to be made ſigns of the ideas which paſs through his mind, and ſo to become means of communicating to each other the knowledge poſſeſſed by each individual.

But men are no leſs plainly intended for *ſocial* life, and the principal benefits of ſuch a mode of living *can only* ariſe from the *mutual* communication of knowledge: but without a ready mode of ſuch communication, the benefits of ſociety would be in a great meaſure loſt, as is plain from that very confined ſort of it, which obtains amongſt the lower orders of living creatures. When therefore ſuch articulate ſounds are *invariably* connected with certain ideas, they become unequivocal *marks*, or *ſigns* of theſe particular ideas; and thus we are enabled to make known to other men the ideas which exiſt in our own minds. And when *viſible* marks are uſed to denote, either ſimple ſounds, as in the letters of the alphabet, or combinations of theſe ſounds, as in the Chineſe characters; each of which repreſents *not* an *idea* (as is, I believe, often thought) but denotes combined ſounds, ſuggeſting, like our words, a particular idea, then we have every thing neceſſary for the conſtruction of language.

The ſenſations excited in the mind by external objects are of two ſorts,

I. Such as are excited by the objects themſelves, and,
II. Such as are excited by *changes* in theſe objects—

and the various *modes* of theſe changes form an endleſs variety of ideas, and occaſion endleſs relations between the words uſed to expreſs the modes of theſe changes.*

* The application of *viſible* words, or audible ſounds to expreſs conſtantly ſome certain ideas muſt be *arbitrary:* becauſe words or ſounds have in general no kind of connection with the ideas they are uſually choſen to expreſs. But though *this* circumſtance of language is plainly *arbitrary*, yet the *nature* of *it*, as far as regards the relations of words to each other, muſt unqueſtionably ariſe from the *original* relations of the ideas to be expreſſed.

Now the firſt application of *ſingle* words, would naturally be to *expreſs* the *exiſtence* of external objects, and accordingly the word allotted for this purpoſe has uſually been called the *nominative* caſe of ſuch word. The *involuntary* uſe of the corporeal ſenſes would ſuggeſt the exiſtence of a great variety of objects, but the knowledge of the relations of theſe objects to each other, that is, the different powers poſſeſſed by them, of producing changes in each other, would require greater attention to, and more extended acquaintance with them. Men would diſtinguiſh between the objects which *produced* theſe various changes, and thoſe *in which* theſe changes *were* produced, and this *difference* would ſuggeſt the notion of *active* and *paſſive* powers, as they are called: and the obſervation of inſtances in which the exertion of power produced a change only in the object itſelf, and not in any other, would give riſe to the idea expreſſed by the *middle* verb in the greek, (an idea between agent and patient, or rather made up of both) the reciprocal verbs in modern languages; and hence alſo the idea of the *neuter*, in both ancient and modern, would naturally ariſe.

The powers of producing changes, which were obſerved to be conſtant and uniform, would naturally be ſuppoſed to reſide in the object, and belong to, or be poſſeſſed by it; and hence the notion of the *genitive* caſe in nouns. The change *produced* would be attributed to the operation of this power, which would be ſuppoſed to introduce, or effect ſuch change, and *give*, as it were, this *new nature* to the object changed, and hence would ariſe the idea of the *dative* caſe. When the effect of the operation of theſe powers *was* to be pointed out, or the agents exerciſing ſuch powers were to be *denounced*, a caſe, (hence called the accuſative caſe) is uſed: and when theſe powers were obſerved to be taken from the objects in which they were ſuppoſed uſually to reſide, and the inſtrument of this *deprivation* was alſo obſerved; words expreſſive of theſe circumſtances, would of courſe conſtitute the *ablative* caſe; and as inſtruments of action muſt *accompany* the actor, the ſignification of *accompanying*

Now we can collect the nature of our ideas, and of the knowledge arising from them, only by considering

was also applied to *this* case. When particular men were wanted for particular purposes, their attention would be excited by a *personal* address, in what is hence called the *vocative* case.

To prevent an embarrassing multitude of words, wholly different from each other, the practice of prefixing small words, and transferring their signification to the compound, or rather of combining the significations of *both*, took place; and the ideas annexed to each part of the compound, *slid* as it were into each other. A few instances will explain my meaning. In the greek language, καλεω is to call, and αναχαλεω, to call *aloud* (to speak *up* as we say) and as we call aloud to persons at a distance, when we wish them to hear us, it signifies to *recall:* and when things, which being worn, or broken, are by being repaired, *recalled* as much as possible into their *former* state, this same word signifies to *mend*. Thus again φερω is to bring, καταφερω to bring *down*, and, as in striking the arm is brought down, it also signifies to *strike*. And these *derivative* significations, are sometimes directly opposite to the sense from which they take their rise. Thus ιστημι is to set, or place, and ανιστημι to set *up*, hence it signifies to *build;* and as buildings are then most compleatly destroyed when their very foundations are raised (razed) up, it also signifies to pull down. Thus again the proposition Δια signifies *through;* and as when things are pierced through, they are *completely* divided, when joined to the verb λαμβανω to take, it signifies to share, i. e. to *divide* into shares; and so Plutarch tells us that at the funeral of Paulus Emilius, the strong young men, διαλαβοντες το λεχος, carried it to the grave, *dividing* sharing the load, equally, i. e. *completely* amongst them. So again describing the attack of Philopœmen upon Machanidas, each being on horseback, he says that Philopœmen (not λαβων but) διαλαβων τοξυσον—taking his javelin or lance by the centre of gravity, dividing the weight equally in his hand, that is *poizing* his weapon. Here the simple word λαβων would not have conveyed that *image*, or picture of the combat, which the writer so graphically describes.

That a combination of two or more words into one was intended to change the signification of the *simple* word, none can doubt, for otherwise, why make this addition to it? When then we see translators paying no regard to such addition, but preserving the signification of the uncompounded word, we may have much reason to suspect that they do not give us the *true*, or the *full* sense of the passage, and then we should always examine for ourselves. Thus, when St. Paul speaking to the Elders of the Ephesian church, represents himself as not withholding any information from them, which could be

the ways by which we become poſſeſſed of theirs: and we can collect the relations of words to each other, only

uſeful for their furtherance in the faith, in order to ſtrengthen his own vindication, he not only recounts his own *public* and *private* diligence, but he adds διαμαρτυρόμενος, both to Jews and Greeks repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jeſus Chriſt. Beza ſaw that ſome addition was wanting to ſtrengthen the ſenſe of the ſimple verb μαρτύρομαι, and therefore tranſlates it etiam atque etiam teſtificans. He was aware that the Apoſtle meant an oppoſition to ὑπομιμνήσκειν, τῶν συμφερόντων; but he was not aware of the *peculiar force* of the prepoſition διὰ which is derived from the *compleatneſs* of that *diviſion* which is cauſed by piercing any thing through and through, as we commonly expreſs it. For this idea of *compleatneſs* which we expreſs by the word *thoroughly*, attends this prepoſition in inſtances where even the metaphorical ſignification of it is quite inapplicable; and ſuch it is in the preſent caſe. Where it means not *ſimply* teſtifying, but bringing ſuch compleat, ſuch *thorough* evidence of the truth of what he taught as could not *poſſibly*, that is, innocently be rejected. And it may be obſerved, that this ſenſe clearly points out the force of the apoſtle's intended antitheſis, between διαμαρτυρομαι & ὑποτιθεμαι; for he might have teſtified ſome particulars *over* and *over again*, and yet have not mentioned many of the τὰσυμφέροντα *to their conviction*; nor have the different meanings of the prepoſition διὰ, any the leaſt relation to the idea of repetition that I can diſcover.

The following obſervations may further ſhew the importance of attending to the meaning of compound words. The doctrine of aſſurance as held by the Calviniſts, implying, as I collect from their writings, not what the apoſtle calls a lively hope, to which we are led by the abundant evidence of the goſpel, but abſolute certainty of our own ſalvation, and which is wholly founded upon their interpretation of the words πληροφορια and its derivatives. For all their writers take what is delivered, without examination, from one another, like the poet's hogs, "in huts of Weſtphaly." According to their expoſition of πληροφορεω it means plenam fidem facio and πληροφορεομαι plene perſuadeor—*certus* reddor: And the German critic Stock, from whom this is taken, ſays generatim notat *pleno motu* in aliquid ferri—ſpeciatim, proprie eſt navium, quæ plenis velis in portum feruntur—metaphorice eſt animi qui pleno aſſenſu et fiducia in aliquid fertur. The whole of this expoſition is intirely imaginary, and not at all grounded upon the real meaning of the words. Πληροφορια, and πληροφορεω are compounded of the words πληρης full, and φορεω to bear or carry, which is derived from φορα a load, or burden, whatever is brought; and πληροφορια means a full load, ſuch as was ſuppoſed to be the cargo of ſhips, returning

by conſidering the nature of the ideas they are intended to expreſs. This knowledge of the relations of words to

to their own country, *deeply laden* with the produce of other nations; like bees to their hives, laden with wax and honey, the produce of diſtant flowers, as faſt as they can: but the notion of ſhips entering their ports with *full* ſail, is as far from real practice, as this critics ideas are from thoſe which are really annexed to this word; for it is always uſed in ſcripture to expreſs, not the *ſtrength* of the evidence, but the *abundance* of it: becauſe it is of the *eſſence* of probable evidence to admit of augmentation, and hence we find the *degrees* of faith continually noticed in the goſpel; but certainty admits not of degrees; the information ariſing from the *full* and *fair* evidence of our ſenſes, from intuition, and from demonſtration, cannot be increaſed. *Twenty* different demonſtrations of the ſame propoſition do not make the truth of it a whit more certain than *one;* but freſh circumſtances may increaſe probable evidence, till the truth of it becomes, not *certain* indeed, but utterly *indiſputable* and *unqueſtionable*. The goſpel might come with evidence, *wonderful* in its *nature*, and *abundant* in *quantity*, as the Apoſtle expreſſes it, not in word only but in (miraculous) power, and in the Holy Ghoſt, and *therefore* with much aſſurance; but the aſſurance St. Paul ſpeaks of here, is what he elſewhere calls the full aſſurance of *hope:* he underſtood too well, though modern divines do not, the difference between the full aſſurance of *hope*, and the full aſſurance of *certainty*, to confound theſe utterly inconſiſtent ſtates of mind together, or to imagine them to be the *ſame;* and ſo he juſtly obſerves, that hope which is *ſeen*, i. e. hope for the *reality* of whoſe objects we have the *full* and *fair* evidence of *ſenſe*, is not hope: becauſe whatever is the object of ſenſe is *certain*, but hope from the very nature of it implies *ſome* uncertainty. With equal clearneſs and propriety he ſpeaks of the *full* aſſurance of the underſtanding; that aſſurance, namely, which ariſes from underſtanding the *nature*, and the *number* of the proofs of the truths of the goſpel, which he ſays came in full aſſurance, that is, with unqueſtionable evidence of its truth, though not with the conviction of demonſtration. Thus the very argument uſed to prove this *deſirable* doctrine, *the certainty* of aſſurance, unanſwerably ſhews the thing to be impoſſible: indeed the inconſiſtency of theſe good perſons is not a little remarkable, for while ſome of them wiſh to have it thought that the proofs of the chriſtian religion amount to abſolute certainty, others of them are fearful that faith ſhould be forced upon them by mathematical demonſtration. Knox's Chriſtian Philoſophy, page 42.

each other, conſtitutes what we call grammar; it has its foundation in the conſtitution of the human mind, and in the conſtruction of thoſe organs which fit us for intellectual communication, becauſe, in all languages, modes of ſpeaking are adopted, Euphoniæ gratia.

The human mind is enabled to receive immediate knowledge reſpecting the nature of and changes in the material world—the actions of living creatures, and alſo reſpecting what paſſes in the minds of *other* men, from their information, communicated viva voce, or by writing. Now the knowledge received through our own *external* ſenſes, when theſe ſenſes are accurate, *muſt* be *true*, but the information received from *other* men, *may* be falſe. Becauſe we can know exactly the *degree* of accuracy of our *own* ſenſes, and the degree of care with which we have uſed them; but we can neither know the accuracy of the ſenſes of other men, nor the care with which they have uſed them, nor the ability, integrity, or impartiality of the ſeveral perſons who may have been employed in tranſmitting this knowledge: upon all which circumſtances, the truth of tranſmitted information muſt depend.

Beſides the information received by *external perception*, (as that which we *receive* through our outward ſenſes, may not improperly be called) men are *conſcious* of the *exerciſe* and *application* of their own *internal* powers (in conſequence of the action of their own will:) this latter kind of knowledge is wholly *perſonal*, it cannot be *acquired* by any other man whatever; it can *only* be *received* from the information of the individual who poſſeſſes it.

All theſe different ſorts of information excite in the human mind various ſenſations, and *theſe* ſenſations I call *ideas*; when theſe ideas are to be communicated to other men, it can only be done by *words*, which are arbi-

trary marks of our internal ſenſations, that is, ſigns of our various ideas, agreed upon by men for the purpoſe of mutual intercourſe, and the mutual interchange of their reſpective knowledge.

Now theſe *ſigns* of our ideas being wholly *arbitrary*, the accuracy of theſe ſigns muſt intirely depend upon the care and exactneſs of him who uſes them. The uncertainty of language is often attributed to the imperfection of words, but it ariſes much oftner from the imperfection, i. e. the negligence, inattention, or ignorance of him who uſes them; juſt as the deceitfulneſs, and puniſhment of ſin, ſo much inſiſted on by certain divines, means, in reality, the *diſhoneſty* and *puniſhment* of *ſinners*. It is true that the mode of conſtruction in *ſome* languages is better adapted for preciſion of expreſſion, than it is in *others:* or what amounts to the ſame thing, the relations of words to each other (upon the knowledge of which the exactneſs of language muſt much depend) are capable of being aſcertained, with *more* certainty in ſome tongues than in others. This relation of words to each other conſtitutes what is called the *idiom* of a language, and when writers in one language uſe the idiom of another, they render their own meaning utterly uncertain, unleſs they either give notice *when* they do ſo, or invariably uſe a fixed mode of expreſſing themſelves to convey the ſame ideas; for then they form a language *peculiar* to themſelves. When then the connexion, between the *relative parts* of *ſpeech*, is clearly and invariably pointed out, as it is in all languages in which the uſe of *genders* obtains, we cannot depart with ſafety from the *uſual* ſignification of the *general* idiom, to introduce and eſtabliſh a *particular* ſenſe *inconſiſtent* with it. For, if in any inſtance you break through the *cuſtomary* conſtruction of language, without a better reaſon than an imagination, that the interpretation you propoſe conveys the weightieſt and

moſt natural ſenſe, by what *rule* ſhall any one know when we are to admit, and when to reject the manifeſt intention of ſuch conſtruction? Will not *every* man eſteem his *favourite* interpretation to be the *weightieſt*, and moſt *natural* ſenſe of the paſſage? But without a better rule than the mere fancy of every man, will not the meaning of many paſſages of ſcripture become utterly uncertain.

Dr. Dodderidge, (in his note upon Eph. ii. 8. See his Family Expoſitor) in order to ſet aſide the authority of a very general, and very remarkable idiom, thinks it ſufficient to *aſſert*, that to underſtand the Apoſtle as affirming, that grace and the mode of that grace, is the gift of God, is to make the Apoſtle guilty of a flat tautology. Surely not more ſo, than when the ſame Apoſtle affirms, Tit. iii. 5. "that God ſaved us by his mercy, *not* by works of righteouſneſs which we have done." For if we are ſaved by the *divine mercy*, we cannot be ſaved by our *own* works, ſince mercy is compaſſion to the guilty, as pardon is deliverance from *juſt* puniſhment. Nor does this aſſertion involve tautology: for our ſalvation, i. e. deliverance from puniſhment, and admiſſion into heaven, might be received through the *favour*, the *grace* of *One*; and the intention of this benevolent deſign might originate in *Another*. And ſo we are told, that the ſalvation of ſinners was in conſequence of the eternal purpoſe of God the Father, which he purpoſed in *Himſelf*, and which he purpoſed to accompliſh in (i. e. by) Chriſt Jeſus. There is therefore *no* tautology in affirming that grace, and alſo the means of grace, *are* the gift of God.* The Doctor goes on, "taking the

* It is a matter of the moſt awful, and painful concern to ſuch perſons as are truly deſirous to attain clear views (and who have been called in *ſcorn*, by the writers of the Chriſtian Obſerver, *Mathematical Divines*)—not of the divine reaſons for chuſing the *particular mode* of redemption *ſet forth* in the goſpel—nor of the *manner* in which

clauſe as we explain it, i. e. as aſſerting the *agency* of divine grace in the production of *faith*, *which* in his Comment he calls a *great* and *divine principle* in our *ſouls*, the thought riſes, &c.—Now if inſtead of this pious eulogy upon Faith, he had told us what he meant by *that* word, we ſhould have been better able to judge of the truth of his aſſertions. For if by faith we are to underſtand a firm belief, and well grounded perſuaſion of the general truth of Chriſtianity, founded upon that evidence which God has given for it; how is receiving the truth, upon the evidence of faith, a more divine prin-

this mode has its *efficacy* (ſee the groundleſs, and *therefore* fooliſh explanations of theſe matters, in the writings of almoſt all the ancient, and modern Calviniſts—becauſe of the *former* the Scriptures ſay *nothing*, and only *ſimply*, and *frequently aſſert* the latter) but of the *value* of this redemption, and of the obligations ſinners are under in the firſt place to that *merciful* being; who, though he denounced death as the *certain* and *immediate* puniſhment to the tranſgreſſion of His command, Gen. ii. 17. was nevertheleſs pleaſed to ſuſpend the execution of his threatening (whether the wiſdom of modern theologians can explain this ſeeming alteration of the divine counſels or not) and ſtill continues to preſide over that gracious diſpenſation, which originated *wholly*, and *only* in himſelf, Eph. i. 9. For without his *ſpecial* agency, all that Chriſt has done, or ſuffered can profit men nothing. Since our Lord aſſures us, that *no* man can come unto him—can receive the benefit of his atonement and interceſſion, except the *Father* draw him, John vi. 44. What ſhall we ſay then? that we are under no obligation to the Redeemer?—God forbid! Great, and aſtoniſhing ſurely, was the generous benevolence of Jeſus, who ſeconded the amazing love of the Father, and accompliſhed this great ſalvation at ſuch an expence to Himſelf. For benevolence means only the deſire of the happineſs of others, but generoſity means promoting that happineſs at the expence of the promoter.

It is undoubtedly aſtoniſhing that any ſhould neglect, or diſregard the unſpeakable love and kindneſs of Jeſus, but that any, who are ſenſible of their obligations to him, ſhould overlook, or diſregard the no leſs unſpeakable love and kindneſs of the Father, from whom this gracious diſpenſation took its riſe, is ſtill more aſtoniſhing. Becauſe it is only in conſequence of the eternal purpoſe of God, which he purpoſed, *only*, and *ſolely* in Himſelf, that we have *acceptance* in the *beloved*.

ciple in the ſoul, than receiving it upon the evidence of demonſtration, analogy, &c.? You would not ſay, that by knowledge is meant the effect of it. If you wiſh to underſtand by faith (what is indeed the *natural* conſequence of it, i. e. *that* conſequence which may *juſtly* be expected from it) reliance, confidence, truſt; you may juſt as well underſtand the words intuition, and demonſtration to mean (what is indeed no leſs the natural conſequence of them) certainty. (See an Eſſay upon the Nature of Faith, printed in the Orthodox Churchman's Magazine for November, 1802.) Indeed certain divines ſpeak as if they thought, the *weaker* the evidence, the *more acceptable* to God the *act* of believing: they are very fearful, where no fear is, that faith ſhould be *forced* upon them by *mathematical* demonſtration, (Knox's Chriſtian Philoſophy, page 42, in the note, edit. 2.) Carry but this wiſe notion as far as it will go, and you will arrive at that celebrated maxim *Credo quia impoſſibile.* We need not indeed wonder that little excellence ſhould be attributed to the voluntary operations of our intellectual powers, ſince even one of the warmeſt, and moſt amiable of the affections, and that temper of mind which is the natural conſequence of it, and which is held not a little commendable amongſt men, is very ſlightingly ſpoken of, by much higher authority. If ye love thoſe which love you, what thank have you? for ſinners alſo do the like.—The Doctor ſays, as for the Apoſtle's uſing τουτο in the *neuter* gender to ſignify faith (πιστις) the thing he had juſt before mentioned, there are ſo many *ſimilar* inſtances to be found in Scripture, that one would wonder how it were poſſible for any judicious critics to have laid ſo much ſtreſs upon *this* as they do, in rejecting what *ſeems* beyond all compariſon, the *weightieſt*, and moſt *natural* interpretation. Now what are we to underſtand by a *weighty* interpretation? And do we not mean by a *natural* interpreta-

tion, ſuch an interpretation as ariſes from taking the words in their *common* and *uſual* acceptation, according to their grammatical conſtruction? And might not one equally wonder how it were poſſible for any judicious divines to have laid ſo much ſtreſs upon this *weightieſt* and moſt *natural* interpretation, without ever thinking of aſcertaining the meaning of the words, or ſhewing what they take to be the ſenſe of them. To confirm the truth of *this* aſſertion the Doctor quotes Philip. i. 28. The words of the Apoſtle are as follows: Καὶ μὴ πτυρόμενοι ἐν μηδενὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς μὲν ἔνδειξις ἀπωλείας, ὑμῖν δὲ σωτηρίας, καὶ ΤΟΥΤΟ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ. Alſo Eph. vi. 18. διὰ πάσης προσευχῆς καὶ δεήσεως προς εύχομενοι ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ ἐν πνεύματι, καὶ εἰς ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟΥΤΟ ἀγρυπνοῦντες· And Galat. iii. 17. Τοῦτο δὲ λέγω διαθήκην προκεκυρωμένην ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς Χριστὸν Ὁ μετὰ ἔτη, &c. Alſo iv. 19. τέκνια μοῦ ΟΥΣ. He might have added 2. Cor. ii. 6. and Apocal. ii. 15. He refers likewiſe to two celebrated ſcripture critics, Elſner and Raphael, but he has not thought proper to adduce their obſervations in a matter, which might ſeem of ſome importance, when he was endeavouring to eſtabliſh an interpretation, which, for aught appears, may be unintelligible, and not leſs oppoſite to common ſenſe, than to the rules of grammar. In ſuch circumſtances, one ſhould have thought, a writer would avail himſelf of every thing he could: for not only the moſt judicious critics, by whom he ſets ſo light, grammarians in general, are ſo ſenſible of the uſefulneſs of preſerving the uniformity and regularity of the eſtabliſhed conſtruction of language, that they conſtantly, and univerſally adhere to the cuſtomary rules, as the only way of aſcertaining, and rendering permanent the information conveyed by, and received from it. Whereever therefore theſe apparently anomalous conſtructions are to be met with, they univerſally refer them to an elliptical expreſſion, or a propoſitional antecedent. For propoſitions can be the predicate of other propoſitions; and how numerous ſoever theſe irregular conſtructions

may be, you are not authoriſed by their frequency to violate the general analogy of grammar, unleſs you can ſhew that the referring theſe expreſſions to an ellipſe, or a propoſitional antecedent renders the ſentence, in which they are found, unintelligible.

Had Doctor Dodderidge attended to the accuracy of St. Paul's language, rather than to his *own* ſyſtem of divinity, he would have ſeen that the Apoſtle was ſufficiently careful of preciſion in his ſtyle: for he might have noticed, in the very verſe quoted from Philipians, that in the ſecond clauſe St. Paul uſes ἥτις (which faith) not ὅτι (which thing) plainly referring to πίστει in the verſe immediately preceding.

But not only the grammatical conſtruction of the words uſed, the ideas conveyed by them, equally forbid the reception of Dr. Dodderidge's interpretation, as may appear from the Eſſay before referred to, and from the Appendix to that Eſſay, to both which *this* was intended as an introduction; but was I believe thought too *Logical* for a religious magazine.

AN ESSAY UPON THE NATURE AND USE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

The ideas which men are poſſeſſed of ariſe in their minds, either

I. In conſequence of the action of external objects upon the corporeal ſenſes. For the Creator of mankind has ſo formed the human frame, that the various works of creation, i. e. external objects, can produce changes in the *ſtate* (though not in the *nature)* both of our *faculties* and *diſpoſitions*, by means of our corporeal ſenſes; changes in which our *power* of choice, i. e. our will, has no concern: and the involuntary, i. e. the unſought information ariſing from theſe effects of external objects

upon our *ſenſes*, make a very great and a very uſeful part of our knowledge.

Or they are,

II. Modifications of theſe original ideas, produced by means of the *operations* of the internal powers of the mind, in conſequence of the *action* of the will.

The *firſt* information received by human creatures, is plainly that which is received from the *effects*, or as it is ſometimes called, from the *impreſſions* of external objects upon the ſenſes of the body, that is, as Mr. Locke would ſay, from ſenſation. Now I call every information ariſing from a *ſingle* effect produced upon the ſenſes by an external object, an *original* perception, and the effect itſelf produced upon the mind by this *original* perception, I call an *idea:* ſo that ideas are *not* perceptions, but the effects, or conſequences of perceptions, of whatever ſort theſe perceptions are: and in proof of *this* difference, it may be obſerved, that although the human mind has a power of recalling its ideas, which power we call *memory*, and the exerciſe of this power, recollection, yet men cannot recall the *actual* perception received by the ſenſes; for if they could, the effects of the actions of external objects might be rendered *perpetual*; pain and pleaſure derived from the ſenſes would become capable of endleſs repetition, or rather of endleſs continuation; one ſmelling bottle might ſerve a nation, and the dog would cry at the ſound of that bell, which now he only runs from, through apprehenſions of the whip which is tied to it.

But though the mind has little or no power over its *original*, or *tranſmitted* perceptions, it has great power over its own ideas: and though it cannot *create* an idea, *originally*, from itſelf, independent of the actions of ex-

ternal objects; yet juſt as men cannot *create* matter, but can only alter the form and ſize of that which is created; can ſeparate it, or join it together in various ways; ſo they can alſo modify their ideas: can by comparing them diſcern the differences between them; can *ſeparate* from each other ſuch as have been *ſuggeſted together*, as it were in company: and can *combine together*, ſuch as have been *ſuggeſted ſeparately*. But theſe ideas *thus* modified, neither are, nor can be ſuggeſted to the mind by external objects, through the immediate action of the ſenſes; they owe their origin to the voluntary operations of the intellectual powers, yet theſe ideas thus modified are capable of various relations; and while the ideas remain unchanged, theſe relations remain unalterable. Matter indeed can, and often does admit of changes, which may not be perceptible at the time they take place, though diſcoverable afterwards, but our ideas admit of no imperceptible changes. When then we *ſelect* certain ideas from amongſt others, for our contemplation and conſideration; and remove from our attention certain other ideas which were received along with them, the ideas ſo ſelected are called *abſtract*, i. e. abſtracted ideas, that is, ideas taken from ſuch as accompanied them when they entered into the mind.

It ſeems to me that Mr. Locke ſpeaks of this and other operations of the mind, as if they were the effects of much, and mature reflexion. But like words, and what is more, the peculiar force of words, they appear to be learned, by intercourſe and experience. I have known a child perfectly acquainted with the expreſſive force of language, before it was able to ſpeak plain, ſay "I ownt"—"I ownt"—*I ſay* I ownt; and upon being corrected, ſay "I'ill—I'ill—*indeed* I'ill." From perceiving ſeveral objects of the ſame kind, children

ſoon learn the nature and uſe of numbers, and quickly diſcern that one is not two, and that one and two put together do not make four. From obſerving the different ſize and colour of birds they ſoon learn to include them under the general name; and thus they begin to exerciſe the power of abſtraction, before they are able to underſtand the nature and the uſe of it, and without knowing what a ſelf-evident propoſition is, they perceive clearly that the whole is greater than a part, and when half an apple is offered to them, wiſely cry for the whole. It is in ways like theſe that mankind learn to exert their various powers, and to exerciſe their various faculties of body and mind.

Abſtract ideas may relate either to

I. Quantity.——Under the idea of quantity, I comprehend whatever is capable of meaſure—as lines—ſurfaces—ſolids: and it may be angles—ratios—numbers. It will readily be underſtood, that by meaſures, is meant meaſures ſui generis. The purpoſe of this kind of abſtraction is to obtain *general* truths, reſpecting different kinds of magnitude. Theſe truths are the ſubjects of all mathematical reaſoning.

When mathematicians prepare ideas for the diſcovery of what is called mathematical truth by abſtraction, the ideas removed from conſideration, are (as in all caſes of abſtract ideas) univerſally ſuch, as have any connexion with *real* exiſtence, that is, ſuch as are matters of ſenſe. So the ſolids have *no* ſubſtance—the plain ſurfaces *no* thickneſs—the lines *no* breadth—the points *no* magnitude—the figures *no* ſize. The triangles ſuppoſe are neither equilateral—equicrural—ſcalene—acute, right, or obtuſe angled, &c. The knowledge acquired is *general* knowledge, and therefore is only *ideal*. Draw

the figures upon paper, cut them out of any ſubſtance whatever, and the propoſition (as referred to ſuch figures) is *not* true. The *aſſumed* circumſtances are wholly arbitrary, and upon theſe arbitrary circumſtances, the truth to be demonſtrated intirely depends.

Having thus aſcertained the ideas, whoſe relations they propoſe to inveſtigate, they uſually proceed to lay down what they call poſtulates, that is, requiſitions to admit, not the poſſibility of making a ſolid, which has *no* ſubſtance; a ſurface, which has *no* thickneſs, or of drawing a line, which has *no* breadth, and making a point, which has *no* ſize; nor yet of *conceiving* ſuch a ſolid, or ſuch a ſurface, line, or point, which is equally impoſſible; but to admit the poſſibility of conſidering a ſolid with regard to extenſion *only*; a ſurface merely with regard to its length and breadth; a line with regard to its length and direction, when compared with other lines, as to theſe circumſtances; and the poſſibility of conſidering a *point* with regard to its *ſituation only*. A poſtulate then implies, that ſuch *partial* conſideration does not involve any *ideal contradiction*; ſuch as it is to require the *whole* to be taken out of a part.

When then a mathematician propoſes certain ideas for conſideration, he does not ſay conceive a line, or lines in general, or conceive a point in general: he ſuppoſes you poſſeſſed of theſe ideas by *ſome* way or other: for ſuch ideas are *ſimple* ideas, and do not admit of being *defined*: but he ſays conceive a line of ſuch or ſuch a length, or continued in ſuch a direction: or conceive a point ſo and ſo placed, &c. As, conceive three lines of ſuch a ſort, that any two of them, taken together, may be longer than the third, and let theſe lines be ſo joined as to *include* ſpace: or conceive a curve *returning* into *itſelf*, of ſuch a ſort that a point may be taken *within* the curve, at an equal diſtance from every part of ſuch

curve, &c. Now all these circumstances are matters of *choice* to him, and from ideas so circumstanced, according to his pleasure, he can trace out various relations, and deduce various truths.

But abstract ideas may relate

II. To the circumstances which discriminate the various sorts of animate and inanimate matter from each other respectively.—Now when we remove from our attention the peculiar ideas, which accompany the particular external objects that excite these ideas in our minds; and select for our contemplation, those ideas which are excited *not* by *one* single object only, but by a *considerable number* of these objects; that is, when we abstract *such* ideas as are to be found in *all* these objects, from those in which *every* individual differs from every other individual, we form a *general idea*, not indeed agreeing with any one individual, but generally descriptive of the whole species.

Therefore when we have recourse to abstraction in order to generalize our ideas, and to rank *numbers* of particular beings under *one term*; the ideas to be abstracted, are not matters of *arbitrary* appointment; this abstraction must be so made as to *include* those ideas only, in which *all* the particular beings to be comprehended under this *one* term agree; rejecting from our consideration all the rest. Thus if you chuse to generalize the term bird, and, instead of applying it to one particular individual, you wish to extend it to, and to comprehend under it every *sort* of birds, whatever be their shape, size, colour, &c.; you must select such circumstances as belong to the *whole kind*, and to this species of living creatures *only*. It will not therefore be sufficient to describe birds as such creatures which *lay*

eggs ſuppoſe, becauſe tortoiſes and alligators lay eggs; nor will it be ſufficient to deſcribe them as ſuch living things as fly, for then you would exclude oſtriches, and take in flying fiſhes and inſects; but if you deſcribe them as having two legs and two wings, and perhaps you may add feathers, though I know not whether bats are not covered with hair, your *general* deſcription may be exact.

As the ſubject of one ſort of abſtraction is that from whence we derive the different relations of quantity, or magnitude, in *general*; and another ſort that by which we are enabled to make a general arrangement of beings, whether animate, or inanimate, in order to comprehend great numbers under one *generic* term, the ſubject of the next ſort of abſtraction is that which comprehends,

III. Such abſtract ideas as ariſe from the conſideration of the actions of *intelligent* and *reſponſible* beings: and by generalizing ſuch actions we arrive at thoſe *moral* ideas called, *mixed modes*.

Now I call beings reſponſible beings, who are capable of *receiving*, and alſo of *diſcerning* the *fitneſs*, *propriety* and *rectitude* of ſuch *rules* of action as may be given unto them. Animals are capable of having their actions governed in ſome degree, and in an imperfect manner, by the application of *immediate* pain. The horſe that is troubleſome to the ſmith that ſhoes him, may be reſtrained from his offenſive tricks, by a great knock on his ribs with the hammer, or a good kick on the guts; but this correction affords *no* inſtruction to the team which is paſſing by at the inſtant. Man alone of all creatures that we are acquainted with, is capable of perceiving the *fitneſs*, *propriety* and *rectitude* of that rule

of action which God his Creator has given him, by whatever way it may be made known to him.

We become acquainted with the *mere* actions of men, in the ſame way as we become acquainted with the actions of all other creatures, or with the nature of, and changes in the material world about us. And we are called upon by that mental conſtitution which God has given us, to conſider the *nature* of our own actions, for the direction of our *own* conduct juſt in the ſame way, and juſt as much, as we are called upon by the poſſeſſion of ſight, to direct our ſteps; becauſe to what purpoſe are the manifold gifts of God beſtowed upon us, but that we may avail ourſelves of all the benefits from them which they can afford us. For this is the *peculiar* advantage of intelligence.

God then has made men reſponſible creatures; and all thoſe relations which intercede between agents and their actions, that is, between men and their conduct, ariſe from, or are built upon this reſponſibility; and upon theſe relations *all moral* character is founded. But character is not diſcoverable from, or to be attributed to a few detached actions. It ariſes from the *general eaſt*, or tenor of our diſpoſitions, and theſe can only be collected from the *general caſt* and *tenor* of our actions; that is, from our uſual and cuſtomary conduct. Known indeed to God are all our diſpoſitions, even *before* they proceed to *intention*; but man ſeeth not as God ſeeth, and can only judge of the *internal* diſpoſitions, that is of the character, from the *outward* conduct.

Now it is *intention alone* which conſtitutes the difference between the voluntary operations of intelligent agents, and the *caſual* effects proceeding from irrational creatures, or from thoſe of inanimate matter. Becauſe intention implies a *deſire* of producing certain *foreſeen* effects; and the intentions of intelligent agents can only be collected by the *occaſional* circumſtances of each

particular action: juſt as their *permanent* diſpoſitions can alone be diſcovered by the *conſtant tenor* of their conduct; and as the preſence or abſence of intention can only be collected by the occaſional circumſtances of each *particular* action, ſo the *nature* of theſe intentions, that is, the *morality*, the rectitude, or depravity, their title to approbation, or abhorrence can likewiſe alone be known by a conſideration of theſe *ſame* occaſional circumſtances, of mens' reſpective actions. For the more ready communication of knowledge, men have generalized theſe ideas reſpecting their various diſpoſitions, and the conduct ariſing from theſe diſpoſitions, juſt as they generalize many other ideas, reducing them into ſorts, and giving names to the *various* ſorts; names, not expreſſive of the particular diſpoſitions, or particular conduct of *ſingle* individuals, but of *all* diſpoſitions, and *all* conduct of a *ſimilar* ſort, to be found in men of all ages and nations: and theſe ideas, thus joined together under, or (as Mr. Locke would ſay) by one name, are uſually called *mixed modes*.

Thus, we call contentment a *habit* of reſtraining our uneaſineſs under the *want* of ſome good, patience a habit of reſtraining our uneaſineſs under the *preſſure* of ſome evil. Thus again, fortitude is a habit of bearing *preſent* evil, for the ſake of future good. Self-denial an habit of reſtraining *innocent* deſires, that *blamable* ones may be more eaſily governed. Benevolence an habitual deſire of promoting the good of others, generoſity an habit of promoting the good of others at the *expence* of the *promoter*, and ſoon.

Now theſe mixed modes have their foundation, like all other abſtract ideas, in that conſtitution, or frame which God has appointed in this world. (See Butler's Sermons, edit. iii. p. 47.) that is to ſay, in the relations of human creatures to each other, or to other intelligent beings: and this conſtitution is *permanent*, or, according

to the uſual way of ſpeaking, nature is always the *ſame*: that is, certain *ſorts* of diſpoſitions, i. e. certain *ſimilar* diſpoſitions, (for by *ſorts* of things we always mean *ſimilar* things) are to be found in great numbers of individuals. It never happens that ſome diſpoſitions, which *once* generally prevailed in conſiderable portions of mankind, ceaſe to be found in the human race. The *general* ideas taken from theſe diſpoſitions, or from the conduct ſuch diſpoſitions naturally, i. e. *uſually* produce, like all other abſtract ideas, are *fixed* and *invariable*; and *theſe* ideas muſt have been generally included under *thoſe* names, which have been commonly annexed to ſuch ideas; which names are to be found in the languages of almoſt all nations. For it is to be preſumed, that writers no more uſe their words, without any meaning annexed to ſuch words, than men ever talk a language to others, which the ſpeakers know is not underſtood by the hearers. As then the ideas annexed to the *words uſed* by *writers* to expreſs mixed modes, muſt be *fixed* and *invariable*; it is not poſſible that ſuch expreſſions ſhould *wholly* change their meaning: e. g. juſtice cannot ſignify injuſtice, or cruelty humanity, generoſity ſelfiſhneſs, profuſeneſs parſimony, or truth falſhood. In enumerating then the ideas which enter into mixed modes uſed by any writers, we muſt not include amongſt them ſuch ideas, with which it is impoſſible theſe writers ſhould be acquainted. Thus we find the word virtue uſed by the Grecian and Roman moraliſts, but if you ſay that virtue conſiſts in conformity of the human conduct to the will of God, you put into your definition of virtue an idea, with which it is impoſſible that theſe moraliſts ſhould be acquainted. Becauſe obedience to the will of God, implies a *knowledge* of the *unity* of God: but the unity of God, was either not known, or not acknowledged, by the profeſſors of Polytheiſm. This definition of virtue then ſeems liable

to the ſame objection, as that of Dr. Paley, (ſee the ſecond ſet of Eſſays by T. Ludlam, Eſſay viii.) It involves ideas, which neither were, nor could be known to many, who were no ſtrangers to this mixed mode. For moral modes are founded upon the *common* principles of our *common nature*, and therefore muſt lie within the bounds of *natural* knowledge They cannot have any connexion with ſuch knowledge as is plainly ſupernatural, however deſirable this latter ſort of knowledge may become from circumſtances, which although foreſeen, certainly *could not be intended*; becauſe to ſuppoſe a deficiency of knowledge *intended*, is to overturn *all* thoſe ideas, which men are enabled to collect, and which it ſeems was the *deſign* of their Creator, that they *ſhould* collect from his works, concerning his *nature* and his *diſpoſitions*.

But it is not merely to thoſe abſtract ideas which regard the relations, that either make part of, or ariſe from, that conſtitution which God has appointed us, that our attention is neceſſary, if we would attain *preciſe* knowledge: we muſt never forget that *theſe* ideas are not received from *any one* particular object, like *thoſe* of ſenſe, but that they are wholly *factitious*, the mere creation of the mind, formed only for the purpoſe of giving readineſs to the verbal communication of knowledge. Abſtract terms are nothing but an invention to aſſiſt human language: Theſe terms muſt therefore never be uſed as if they were expreſſive of objects really exiſting; becauſe when general terms, which are only expreſſive of abſtract ideas, are uſed as if ſuch terms were applicable to *real* exiſtence, that is, to ſuch objects for which we have the *teſtimony* of our *ſenſes*, much confuſion muſt ariſe from this improper and injudicious application, as the following inſtances will abundantly ſhew:—

"To fathers in their private families," says Bishop Horne, in his Discourse upon the Origin of Civil Government, "*nature* has given *supreme* power."—Nature! —The God of nature surely! The term nature is a *mere* word: the mark not of any particular, but of a general or abstract idea, to which *no precise* meaning *is*, or can be annexed. It refers to that *usual* and *established mode* of acting, which God has thought proper to employ in his work of creation: and when we talk of the gifts of nature, we mean those gifts of God, those powers, faculties, qualities, qualifications which *he* bestows indiscriminately, though perhaps not equally, upon all the various *species* of beings *respectively*: and these powers, faculties, qualifications, qualities, when referred to each respective species, are called the *nature* of that species: when writers then apply this general, or abstract term, as if it stood for some *particular* matter, and fancy they affirm some thing, they in reality affirm nothing, no *particular* truth. But general truths have no relation to—are no marks of real existence; and so the *same general term*, which represents to the mind no *one* thing in the universal world, *equally* serves the pious Bishop of Norwich, and the Infidel defenders of Atheism, (see Dr. Paley's Natural Theology, page 446,) for the support of their respective systems.

So again, when Mr. Robinson, a celebrated gospel minister affirms, that the *same* nature which sinned, atoned, (Script. Charact. Vol. iii. p. 29, or 35) and when Dr. Hawker, a no less celebrated gospel minister affirms the direct contrary, (see his Essay upon the Divinity of Christ, page 8,) that the *same* nature which sinned, did *not* atone, for that the *divine* nature, (which *could not* sin) atoned; neither one nor the other of these two great divines, was able to perceive that they had no ideas to their words; for both divine and human nature are merely abstract terms, and could no more atone,

than they could talk. It would have been juſt as intelligible, and juſt as wiſe to ſay that human nature might be puniſhed, might be hanged ſuppoſe, or tranſported to Botany-Bay, or be whipped at the cart's-tail. Take another inſtance of this literary legerdemain. "The Holy Spirit," (ſays Mr. Cruden, ſee his Concordance, word Spirit) "is called a perſon," (not in Scripture ſurely) "becauſe whatever *belongs* to perſon, as to underſtand, to will, to give, to call, to do, to ſubſiſt of himſelf, doth agree to the ſpirit," and he adds, "who appeared in a viſible ſhape." But ſurely Mr. Cruden would no more call the Dove a perſon, or the fiery tongues, than he would call the flame of fire in the buſh, which Moſes ſaw, a perſon, Deut. iv. 12, 13. By perſon Mr. Cruden plainly means the *general* idea of living being; though this is by no means the common idea of perſon; for if perſon means any thing, it means a viſible human form; and if it does not, it would be equally proper to talk of the perſons of animals.

In a note of Dr. Hey's Norriſian Lectures, Vol. ii. p. 275, we are told that Biſhop Pearſon ſays, "God died for us," and Dr. Hey adds, that the Biſhop means that *perſon* died. Here the idea annexed to the word perſon is not the idea of *being in general*, but that of a particular ſort, which we call (and underſtand by it human) body: and it might with equal propriety have been affirmed, no leſs than of perſon, that preſence (another general, or abſtract idea) died. With equal want of *diſtinct* ideas, we are told in the ſame Note (what is indeed often ſaid by divines, but I think never in Scripture) that *Chriſt has two natures*, in *one* perſon. Aſcertain but the ideas conveyed by the words nature and perſon, and the propoſition will be found utterly *unintelligible*. The word perſon conveys only an abſtract, or general idea; we do not underſtand by this term the idea of body, or of living body in *general*, for then we might ſpeak of the

perſons of animals: ſtill leſs can it be ſuppoſed to mean, the ſame as it meant by the word ſpirit; for the idea annexed to the word ſpirit is merely negative, (ſee an Eſſay upon the Epiſtle to the Romans, printed in the Orthodox Churchman's Magazine for January, 1803,) and when we ſpeak of ſpirits, it means, if it means any thing, that ſpirits have *no* perſons; i. e. no viſible form, as men have; becauſe the word perſon is only uſed to expreſs the *general* form of the human body, that is, a form which has *no* ſize, colour, &c. and therefore the word perſon in general, neither does, nor can imply any thing which really exiſts, that is, which is the object of ſenſe; becauſe we neither have, nor can have, any *ſenſible* knowledge of whatever exiſts without colour, ſize, &c. We may indeed *believe* that ſuch things exiſt, but *faith* is *not knowledge*; and it is never ſuppoſed that the word perſon conveys what is only an object of *faith*. Divines indeed have applied this word to the Supreme Being, but unqueſtionably without any idea,*

* A remarkable inſtance of this miſapplication we have in the 23d Chapter of Dr. Paley's Natural Theology, written expreſsly upon what he calls the *Perſonality* of God, as if *it* was an attribute of the divine nature.

At p. 439, 2d edit. The Doctor ſays contrivance proves the Perſonality of the Deity. He ſhould have ſaid, the *exiſtence* of a *contriver*, in oppoſition to thoſe who talk of nature, &c. as capable of ſupplying the *place* of an *intelligent* agent. He goes on, now *that* (being I ſuppoſe) *which* can deſign muſt be a *perſon*. If he had ſaid, muſt be a *living* agent, he would have expreſſed himſelf more clearly. For any idea which we can form of *perſon*, has no more *neceſſary* connection with activity, or intelligence, than activity, or intelligence have, with the *exerciſe* of them, being connected with objects of ſight—it is alſo not unuſual to ſpeak of *dead* perſons. He further ſays, the capacities of contrivance and deſign imply conſciouſneſs and thought; and therefore *conſtitute perſonality*. If he had ſaid theſe capacities imply an *intelligent* agent, he would have expreſſed himſelf ſtill more clearly: and if this is not his meaning he ſhould have told us *what* is; becauſe the words perſon, and perſonality are not applicable to all living beings, as we have juſt obſerved. For the

and it has been done only to ſupport an *unintelligible* notion; and ſo the greek words χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως have

abſtract idea annexed to the word perſon, is made up of a viſible human form, unattended with any of the particular ideas of great, or ſmall, tall or ſhort, corpulent or thin, fair or black, freſh coloured or pale, ugly or handſome, &c. The word perſon therefore when applied to a particular being, means, if it means any thing, an object of ſenſe. Nobody talks of the *perſon* of the *ſoul*. To ſay then that in *whatever* the *mind reſides* is a *perſon*, and that the *ſeat* of intelligence is a *perſon*, is humana ad Deos transferre; is to uſe his own words a perverſion of language, for it is to uſe words without ideas. Becauſe what are we to underſtand by a mind *reſiding?* and what by the ſeat of the intellect? To apply ſuch ideas to God, is, it ſhould ſeem, to ſuppoſe that he has parts; otherwiſe why the diſtinction of *where* the mind *is*, and where it is not? And to apply the word perſon to him, is ſurely, if we have any ideas to our words, to ſuppoſe him an object of ſenſe, in direct contradiction to Scripture, Job xxiii. 8, 9. For what other reaſon can be given, why the word perſon is never applied to the human mind, which alone has the capacity of thought, and conſciouſneſs, and therefore of contrivance and deſign? And if the application of the word perſon to God, is not to ſuppoſe him an object of ſenſe, *what* is the *difference* between a perſon and an intelligent being? Perhaps higher orders of intelligent beings may be qualified to diſcern more of the Deity, as well as more of his works, than is permitted to men: but we neither have, nor under our preſent circumſtances can have any more notion (unleſs the Lord imparts new faculties to us, as he did to the prophet and his ſervant, 2 Kings vi. 17,) of this perception than we have of the perceptions, which St. Paul had in the third heaven. *Particular* language therefore in theſe caſes is utterly inapplicable. To have ſaid, as is very properly ſaid, p. 444, that contrivance implies an intelligent author of what is contrived, would have removed this juſtly exceptionable mode of ſpeaking.

It is well obſerved, at p. 446, that the *force* of the reaſoning, (the reaſoning *itſelf* he ſhould have ſaid) is frequently ſunk by our taking up with *mere* names. Thus nature means *not* an *agent*, but the *order*, according to which the author of that nature acts; and it is abſurd to aſcribe to the order of things, a power of producing that order: the things themſelves muſt *firſt* be produced, before that order can take place; for order means only a regular arrangement; but to arrange is the proper work of an intelligent agent, becauſe it implies choice, and choice implies volition, but volition is only the property of living beings. Nature, order, mechaniſm, are abſtract ideas, but the names of abſtract ideas are never the marks of real exiſtence.

been tranſlated, the expreſs image of his perſon, although the word ὑπόστασις, no more ſignifies *perſon*, than it ſignifies *body*. But this jugling change of the meaning has been effected by the magical operation of ſchool divinity.—And what can be meant by the word *nature*, but that ſyſtem or combination of powers, diſ-

It is truly obſerved, p. 458, that perſons who ſpeak of abſtract ideas, ſuch as nature, order, mechaniſm, &c. as cauſes of objects which exiſt, mean to *deny*, or *ſet aſide* the operation of a particular *perſonal* intelligence; that is to ſay, the exertions of an intending, and contriving mind; what is called, p. 462, a deſigning mind, and p. 464, an intelligent deſigning Creator. Now when we ſpeak of an intending, contriving, deſigning mind, we talk of what we *clearly* underſtand, as *far* as we underſtand, though it may not be what we *perfectly*, i. e. intirely comprehend: artificers, and architects, are terms familiar with us; but what idea are we to annex to a *perſonal* intelligence, i. e. a *perſonal mind?* Deſign muſt have had a deſigner; is any thing *more* meant, when it is ſaid, that ſuch deſigner muſt have been a *perſon?* If there is, *what* is it? If there is not, why uſe the word? I am apt to ſuſpect that names like this, to uſe Dr. Paley's words, *refer* us to *nothing*; excite no idea, convey a ſound to the ear but no more.—Vox et præteria nihil.

At p. 475, we are told that it is one of the advantages of revelation, that it introduces the Deity to human apprehenſions under an idea more *perſonal*, more *determinate*, more within its compaſs than the theology of nature. To be ſure if we conſider natural theology alone, we learn little more than that a wiſe, good, and powerful Being is the author and preſerver of the univerſe. It is from revelation that we learn the moſt particular (which make the idea, if not more *perſonal*, certainly more determinate) and therefore the moſt *important relations* in which God ſtands to us, as our ſupreme governor, and our judge; and it is from His word alone that we become acquainted with Him as our redeemer, and our ſanctifier: But if theſe ideas are more *perſonal*, it is becauſe Chriſt is *appointed* to be our judge, John v. 22. Acts xvii. 31; and we are further told, John v. 27, the reaſon of this appointment. But though revelation ſhews us more of the divine goodneſs, it affords us no clearer, nor any further conceptions of the divine power, than we can gather from His works, much leſs does it add any thing to our knowledge of what is here called His *perſonality*: of that, ſo far as we can have any idea to the word, we underſtand not a whit more than we did before, that is —*juſt nothing*.

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poſitions, qualifications, &c. which the Creator of all things has been pleaſed to appoint to the productions of his own will? And then how is it poſſible that any thing can have *two* natures. But theſe divines tell us, what the Scriptures no where do, "that Chriſt has two natures, the divine, and the human." But becauſe Chriſt exerciſed powers far ſuperior to thoſe of men, Luke xi. 20. John iii. 2. are we therefore to aſcribe to him the *underived* poſſeſſion of ſuch power, without *expreſs* authority for ſuch aſcription from holy writ. We ſhould be careful to diſtinguiſh between the *weak* and *uncertain inferences* of human reaſon, and the *clear* and poſitive declarations of divine revelation, in ſubjects upon which we cannot poſſibly acquire any other information than what is imparted to us by God himſelf. And how can we aſcribe the divine nature to any being unleſs we are clearly acquainted with the powers, and diſpoſitions of that nature? Men have frequently exerciſed powers far ſuperior to thoſe uſually allotted to the human race, but whoever thought of aſcribing the divine nature to them. St. Peter exhorts his converts to the practice of the moral virtues, that they may become, *not poſſeſſors*, but partakers of the divine nature; i. e. may reſemble in their meaſure, the great author and poſſeſſor of all moral goodneſs, Matt. v. 48. Luke vi. 35, 36. Matt. v. 45. And as we cannot have any foundation, unleſs from revealed information, to aſcribe the divine nature to any being but the Supreme, ſo we learn from *that* information, that there are parts of the divine nature, which either *could* not, or *do* not, 2. Tim. vi. 16. Matt. xxiv. 36. Mark xiii. 32. belong to any other being but the Supreme. And let not eager, ignorant zeal take fire, as if any thing which is here ſaid is any diminution of the glory, or any diſparagement to the honour of the Redeemer. However little we may underſtand of the relations in which Chriſt ſtands to God, we *clearly*

understand those in which he stands to us. We certainly know that he was our Creator, and is the governor and preserver of this world, and therefore has a claim to every duty and service appendant upon those relations, as well as to all those which arise from his character as our Redeemer. And his most earnest followers would have done better, to have received *implicitly* without attempting to *explain* what we are utterly unable to understand: thus *disgracing* themselves, and dishonouring him, by esteeming it possible that the fruits of ignorance and folly could be acceptable to him.

AN ESSAY UPON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL AND MORAL PROOF.

Few writers attend to the difference between such proof as is applicable to mathematical, and such as is applicable to moral truth. Hence we often hear of *such* truths being *demonstrated*, as are utterly incapable of this *sort* of proof. Mr. Locke himself seems inclined to think both sorts of truth equally capable of demonstration in his Essay upon the Human Understanding, B. III. Chap. xi. Sect. 16. and B. IV. Chap. iii. Sect. 18. Chap. xii. Sect. 8. But had he attended to the different *nature* of mathematical and moral ideas, and also to *that* of the relations interceding between each respective sort, he would probably have been of a different opinion. Ideas are the *materials* of *all* our knowledge; and the *relations* interceding between these *ideas*, determine the *species* of our knowledge.

By ideas I understand,

I. *Original* sensations arising in the mind in conse-

quence of the actions of *external* objects upon the corporeal ſenſes.—Or

II. *Voluntary* modifications of theſe ideas ſo received, in conſequence of the operation of our *internal* powers.

If we conſider the different ways by which we become poſſeſſed of our ideas, we may perhaps diſcover more accurately the *nature* of theſe ideas, the *relations* which ariſe from their nature, and alſo the ſpecies of proof applicable to each reſpective ſort, as depending upon *this* nature, and *theſe* relations.

All our original ſenſations are admitted into the mind through our various ſenſes. Such as are derived from *ſight*, are properly called *images*. A repreſentation of the appearance of the object, is formed in ſome manner within the mind. Such ſenſations as ſpring from our *other* ſenſes are called more properly *ideas*. No reſemblance attends the perceptions from which theſe ideas riſe. Hence it follows that though *all images* are *ideas*, yet *all ideas* are *not images*; and alſo that images are, and muſt be, ideas of particular objects. There can be no ſuch thing as *general*, or *abſtract images*, though there may be *general* or *abſtract* ideas. For the mind has certain powers over its ideas, and can at pleaſure, compare, combine, ſeparate, or recall them; and in conſequence of theſe powers can produce various *modifications* of them, for the more *ready* acquiſition, or communication of knowledge. Thus by abſtracting *all* thoſe circumſtances in which a number of particular ideas *differ* from each other, and retaining all thoſe circumſtances in which they *agree*, the mind *forms* what are called general, or abſtract ideas. But theſe *general* or *abſtract* ideas are never preſented to, or produced in the mind, like our *original* perceptions, by cauſes from *without*, or

foreign to itſelf: they are the *voluntary formation* of the mind; and that they are ſo, is plain; becauſe the mind can form ideas of *this* kind, which are more or leſs general. Thus, bird is a more general idea than ſparrow, and creature than bird, and being than creature. So again ſolid bodies conſiſt of three dimenſions, viz. length, breadth and thickneſs. By abſtracting the idea of thickneſs, and retaining thoſe of length and breadth, we form the idea of a plain ſurface: by abſtracting from the idea of ſurface its breadth, we obtain the idea of a line; and by ſtill further abſtracting from our idea of a line, its length we arrive at, the idea of a *mathematical* point.

The exertion of this power we call the *act* of conceiving; though it may be that we underſtand no more of this faculty, than we do of that which we call recollection. It is nevertheleſs a real power, and is plainly unconnected with that ſpecies of ideas which we call images. For blind perſons are capable, in conſequence of *this* power, of underſtanding the various relations of lines, ſurfaces and ſolids, and alſo the mathematical laws of optics, though how much they know of colours may be collected from the reply of that blind perſon, who ſaid he ſuppoſed that ſcarlet reſembled the *ſound* of a trumpet; nor is it at all likely that ſuch perſons can by any means acquire that ſpecies of ideas which we call images. Mr. Locke mentions an inquiry made by his friend Mr. Molineux, B. II. Chap. ix. Sect. 8. whether a blind perſon who was acquainted with the different properties of the ſphere and cube, might not, upon the recovery of ſight, diſtinguiſh by the uſe of it, one of theſe ſolids from the other? But had Mr. Molineux conſidered that the viſible appearances of bodies depend *wholly* upon the different degrees of light and ſhade, and upon the angles made by the viſual ray with the various bounding lines of ſuch objects, both which can *only* be

ſuggeſted through the *eye*, he might have ſafely concluded that ſuch a perſon could not diſtinguiſh by ſight *only*, triangles from ſquares.* Hence it is plain that images can *only* be received by *ſight*; that they neither are, nor can be received by the touch, even when they reſpect the boundaries of extenſion, or of ſpace, i. e. of figure. Mathematical ideas, therefore, like all abſtract ideas, are unqueſtionably *formed* by the mind, in a manner perhaps inexplicable, the fact however cannot be doubted. *Conceive* ſuch and ſuch ideas is the language reſpecting their formation. They are therefore, and muſt be the *ſame* in all mankind, becauſe they are formed by *preſcription*. Their formation is a matter of *command*, not of *choice*. Every idea preſcribed muſt be taken in, not one can be left out conſiſtent with the truths propoſed to be eſtabliſhed, for it is the relations of *given* ideas to ſpeak in mathematical language, which are to be aſcertained. The idea of a triangle is preciſely the *ſame* in every mind. It is compoſed of the ideas of three ſtrait lines, joined together in ſuch a manner as to include ſpace. So the idea of a circle is exactly *alike* in every man. It is the idea of a curve returning into itſelf, of ſuch a ſort that a point can be taken *within* the curve, *equidiſtant* from *every part* of the curve. A ſtrait line drawn through this point, and continued to each ſide of the curve is called a diameter. Every perſon who forms the idea of ſuch a curve, ſees *immediately*, and *intuitively*, that the diameter is, and muſt *neceſſarily* be double the radius. Again the relations ſubſiſting between theſe ideas, is, and muſt be *immutable*. Whatever be the proportions and inclinations of the ſides of triangles to each other, the three angles of every triangle will invariably be equal to two right angles: Whatever the length of the diameter of any circle, it will al-

* A matter of a ſimilar ſort is related in Addiſon's Tatler.

ways be double the length of the radius: And so of every mathematical proposition. Mathematical truth are therefore *necessary* truths.

The case with *moral* truths is totally different. The ideas from whose relations these truths arise, do not spring like mathematical truths from *prescribed* conceptions: for mixed modes are the voluntary combination of the mind that forms them. The ideas themselves, of which these modes consist, are not *factitious*, as mathematical ideas are; it is the *combination* of them into *one complex* idea which is alone *factitious*; for this combination is perfectly arbitrary, Locke, B. II. Chap. xxii. It depends upon the *will* of him who makes it, and who *chooses* what ideas he will combine together. But the formation of mathematical ideas, so far as regards the nature of them, does not depend upon the will of him who forms them: this nature is ascertained by the *original* formation of them, in consequence of a *prescribed* conception, and therefore admits of no variation. Now by demonstration we mean a *general* proof; viz. one that holds true of *all* the ideas of one sort. Thus what is true of one triangle, or one circle, is true of all other triangles, and all other circles whatever, however they may differ from each other, and so of every other figure. But the truth of propositions consisting of mixed modes, must depend not upon the ideas themselves, but upon this *arbitrary* combination of them; and men rarely agree, either in the ideas they actually join together, or in determining what ideas it is *expedient* to join. So moral obligation is a mixed mode, but what very different definitions are given of it? That is to say, what different ideas are combined together by different persons under this name? so different indeed as to occasion great variety in the conclusions respecting it. But this is not all. For if demonstration was applicable to moral truths, the conclusion *must* be *necessary*. Because

we mean by demonſtration that proof only, whoſe concluſion is *neceſſary*. But if the concluſions of proofs reſpecting human actions were neceſſary (and moral truths reſpect human actions only) there would be an end of *moral* agency, becauſe liberty is the ground of all moral agency; but neceſſity and liberty are inconſiſtent: for by liberty I mean the *power* of choice, and by neceſſity the *want* of this power. Where matters *muſt* be what they *are*, choice can have no place. Could you *demonſtrate* that men *muſt* obey God; i. e. that they could *not poſſibly* diſobey him, obedience would ceaſe to be acceptable. Men would be mere machines. There are indeed who talk of *moral neceſſity*; they might as well talk of neceſſary liberty. The ideas are utterly inconſiſtent, as inconſiſtent as a ſtrait curve.

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